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NOTES
DEATH TAxES AND CONFLICTING CLASSIFICATIONS OF INTERESTS r LAND*
THE FOURTEENTH Amendment has been held to deny the domiciliary
state of a decedent the right to include in his taxable estate real property
situated in another state.' Difficulties in applying this constitutional limitation
arise if the law of thd state of situs of the property and that of the state of
domicile of the owner differ as to -whether the property should be classified
as real property. For example, land subject to a sale contract, or owned by
a partnership or trust, or ordered sold by will, is treated, for some purposes,
as intangible personalty, under the doctrine of equitable conversion.-2 There
has been disagreement in the cases, however, on the issue of whether this
doctrine will be employed for tax purposes so as to confer the power to tax
upon the state of the owner's domicile, rather than upon the state where the
land is situateda If, in any particular case, the two states involved come
to different conclusions upon this issue, the same property may be taxed
twice, or not at all.4 Since either result is undesirable, and since double
taxation may even be unconstitutional in the view of recent cases,5 at least one
*Carrie S. Fair, 35 B. T. A., Nov. 10, 1936.
1. Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925).
2. Stone, Equitable Conversion by Contract (1913) 13 Co L. REv. 369; Note
(1926) 42 A. L. R. 426.
3. Land subject to sale contract: compare It re Boshart's Estate, 107 Misc. 697,
177 N. Y. Supp. 567 (Surr. Ct. 1919), aff'd, 18 App. Div. 783, 177 N. Y. Supp. 574
(4th Dep't, 1919) with In re Paul's Estate, 303 Pa. 330, 154 At. 503 (1931), cert. denied,
284 U. S. 630 (1931), (1931) 41 YALn, L. J. 140. See Comment (1936) 46 YA.u L J.
272, 273. Land held by partnership, see (1916) 30 H uv. L. Rmv. 90. Land held by
trust: Dana v. Treasurer, 227 fass. 562, 116 N. E. 941 (1917); Fead and Green,
ilfassachusetts Trusts and Succession Taxes (1929) 27 MICeH L I.v. 869. Land ordered
sold by will, see (1926) 25 Mficr. L. REv. 84; (1926) 39 HAn%'. L REv. 781. For a
collection of cases on the whole field, see note (1926) 42 A. L. IL 426.
4. State ex rel. Hilton v. Probate Court of Ramsey County, 145 Minm. 155, 176
N. NV. 493 (1920).
5. It was held in Frick v. Pennsylvania, 263 U. S. 473 (1925) that a state may
not collect an inheritance tax upon property that is not within the taidng jurisdiction.
Mfore recent cases [Farmer's Loan and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204 (1930)
and First National Bank of Boston v. faine, 284 U. S. 312 (1932)] indicate that pos-
sibly the transfer at death of any given property can take place at only one point,
and hence that property can have only one taxable situs. Therefore, the Supreme Court
may well hold it unconstitutional for two states, both using their own law, to give
property two separate taxable situses. To prevent this, the Supreme Court could itself
determine the situs of the particular property interest, thus binding the obedience of
both states. However, in view of the variety of possible problems of this type, a
seemingly preferable method would be for the Supreme Court to leave the individual
decisions to the state courts, but to require that one of the two states follow the law
of the other. In the latter case it would be more expedient to make the law of the
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court6 sitting in the state of domicile has classified the decedent's interest
for purposes of taxation by applying'the conflict of laws rule that the law
of the situs of land should determine vhetlier an interest in the land is real or
personal.7
An exactly similar problem does not confront the federal taxing authorities,
for the Constitution has not thus far been interpreted to prohibit the federal
government from taxing foreign real property belonging to an American
decedent.8 But since the federal estate tax specifically exempts from taxation
any "real property situated outside the United States,"9 a comparable prob-
lem of determining what property interests are real may arise, especially if
the foreign interest is unfamiliar, or the foreign law differs in matters of
classification. But the federal problem differs from that of the states; in
the state cases the fundamental issue is the constitutional one of whether or
riot the property being taxed has a taxable situs within the taxing juris-
diction. The distinction between real and personal interests in land is used
as a step in the court's decision on the taxable situs issue, a question of
judicial policy under the Fourteenth Amendment. But under the federal
statute, assuming that the Supreme Court will not hold it unconstitutional
to tax foreign realty, the problem of taxable situs becomes unimportant,
and the scope of the term real property is a problem in statutory construc-
tion, as to whether Congress meant the phrase real property to be read in
state where the land is situated control, in accordance with the conventional conflicts
rule, see infra note 7. It may even be that the due process clause requires the use of
conflicts principles in the resolution of such interstate differences. See Dodd, The
Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of
Laws (1926) 39 HARv. L. R,. 533.
6. Bates v. Decree of Judge of Probate, 131 Me. 176, 160 At. 22 (1932). This was
also considered in Land Title and Trust Co. v. South Carolina Tax Commission, 131
S. C. 192, 206, 126 S. E. 189, 193 (1925), (1925)- 34 YALE L. J. 803.
7. Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U. S. 186 (1900); Freke v. Lord Carbery, (1873) L. R.
16 Eq. 461; lit re Berchtold, [1923] 1 Ch. 192; Re Burke, [1928] 1 D.L.R. 318 (Sas-
katchewan) ; RESTATEmENT, CoNFLicr OF LAws (1934) §§ 208, 209; Dici', CONFLICT oF
LAws (5th ed. 1932) rule 150 (a); WEsTLArE, PrVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (7th ed.
1925) chap. VIII.
8. The Supreme Court stated in Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky,
199 U. S. 194, 202, 204 (1905), a property tax case, that in order to justify taxation
there must be some degree of protection given to property by the taxing state as a
quid pro quo. Foreign realty seemingly receives little such protection, hence there have
been doubts whether such realty might constitutionally be included in the taxable estate
[31 Op. Atty. Gen. (1918) 287]. However, in the more recent case of Burnet v. Brooks,
288 U. S. 378 (1933), the Court states, at page 400, that the federal power to collect
an inheritance tax is subject only to the jurisdictional limitations recognized in inter-
national relations. At present, in the international sphere, where jurisdiction is based
upon the domicile or citizenship of the decedent, the right to tax the total estate,
regardless of the nature or location of the property, is generally recognized, and many
countries now do include foreign realty within the taxable estate. See GUGGENHEIM,
L'INoSITION DES SuccEssIoNs EN DRoiT INTERNATIONAL ET LE PRODBLME DE LA DouLnE
I -osImro (Gen~ve, 1928) 41, 51-67.
9. 48 STAT. 754, 26 U. S. C. § 411 (1934).
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an American sense, or intended interests in land to be classified as real or
personal, for purposes of the statute, in accordance with the accepted con-
flicts rule, by the law of the situs of the land.
Recently a federal estate tax was levied upon Cuban property interests
described as hipotecas, and owned by an American decedent. Since the
hipoteca is considered by the law of Cuba to be an "immovable," a term
generically akin to the Anglo-American "real property," the executrix of
the decedents estate claimed that the Jdpotecas fell within the tax exemption
extended by statute to real property situated abroad.10 The Board of Tax
Appeals, rejecting this contention, held that Congress when it referred to
"real property" intended the term to be used as it is understood in American
law, and that the hipotecas, being like mortgages, were personalty under
American law and therefore taxable. One member dissented. 1
While the conclusion of the majority that Congress intended the scope of
the statutory exemption to be determined by American law is tenablem such
intent is always difficult to establish satisfactorily13 and the adoption of
American law as the criterion of what is real property leads to several con-
10. In the Revenue Act of 1916, section 202 provided for the inclusion in the gross
-taxable estate of "all property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated."
But despite the seeming generality of the provision, partly on the basis of an argument
based upon other provisions of-the Act, and partly through fear that a contrary inter-
pretation would be unconstitutional, both the Treasury Department and the Attorney
General construed this provision as exempting foreign real estate. 31 Op. Atty. Gen.
(1918) 2S7; 20 Treas. Dec. 435, T.D.2735 (1918). The subsequent statutes, including
that of 1926 under which this case arose, repeated the provision, but the Act of 1934
contained an amendment specifically exempting foreign real property. The Board as-
sumed that the 1934 Act merely stated the intent of the 1926 Act, and based its reason-
ing upon the wording of the 1934 Act.
11. Carrie S. Fair, 35 B. T. A., Nov. 10, 1936, on appeal to C. C.A. 3rd. Cf
Matter of Vivanti, 63 Misc. 61S, 118 N. Y. Supp. 6S0 (Surr. Ct. 1909). English cases
on similar tax problems: Toronto General Trusts Co. v. The King, [1919] A. C. 679;
lawson v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, [1896] 2 I. R. 41S; Chatfield v. Berchtoldt,
[1872] L. R. 7 Ch. 192; Forbes v. Steven, [1870] L. R. 10 Eq. 178; Re Sto!:es, [IS90]
62 L. T. 176. See generally Dxcsv,, CoNrricr oF LAws (Ist ed. 1896) Appendix, note 17,
p. 781 (Not in later editions).
12. However, if it should be unconstitutional to tax foreign realty, see 4upra note
8, the Board's interpretation of the statute may result in an unconstitutional tax on
property outside the taxing jurisdiction. The Board reasoned that since a hipolcea
represents a debt, its situs is, by the doctrine of itobilia sequuntur personam, at the
domicile of the creditor and therefore within the taxing jurisdiction. But this assumes
that hipotecas are inobilia, whereas according to conflicts principles that is a prelim-
inary question which should be decided according to ihe law of the situs. Lorenzen,
The Theory of Qualifications and the Conflict of Laws (1920) 20 CoL. L. RL,. 247,
264; Beckett, The Question of Classification (Qualification) in Private Intenmational
Law (1934) 15 BRrr. Y. B. oF Ixv. LAw 46.
13. The Board relied on Retailer's Credit Association of Alameda County, 33
B. T. A. 1166 (1936) to the effect that the taxpayer must come strictly vithin an ex-
emption. But see Eidman v. Martinez, 184 U. S. 578, 583 (1902) that words of exception
must be liberally construed.
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fusing and perhaps unfortunate consequences. Since Cuba has already ex-
ercised its unquestioned power to tax the hipotecas involved,14 a double tax
will necessarily fall upon the estate of the American decedent if the instant
case is upheld on appeal.25 Furthermore, under the view of the statute adopted
by the majority, courts may, in the future, be faced with the complex prob-
lem of classifying strange foreign interests in land according to distinctions
between realty and personalty historically developed in Anglo-American law.
Moreover, the idea of real property has no uniform content throughout the
United States and the resolution of such local diversity presents a supple-
mentary problem to courts endeavoring to apply "American law" to foreign
created interests.10 Because of these difficulties and the absence of any clear
expression of congressional intent to employ the words real property in a
technical American sense,17 it is arguable that the statute should be read to
require the classification of particular interests, in accordance with the con-
flicts rule, by the law of the situs of the land.18 If this construction of the
statute had been followed in the instant case, however, a further difficulty
would have been presented, in that Cuban law does not contain the phrase
"real property." However, the Cuban word immovable seems equivalent
functionally to the American classification real property, although not identical
with it in content, 9 and the disparity in nomenclature should not be enough
to prevent the application of Cuban law.20 However, as a practical matter,
14. See Carrie S. Fair, 35 B. T. A., Nov. 10, 1936, at page 4.
15. That this is to some extent contrary to the intent of the exemption, see Report
of Finance Committee, covering amendment to Section'302 (a) of the Revenue Act of
1926, adopted as Section 404 of the Revenue Act of 1934. SEir. REP. No. 558, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. (1934) 46.
16. If this is viewed as a problem of statutory interpretation, the federal courts are
not bound by state law. Reynols v. N. Y. Trust Co., 188 Fed. 611 (C. C. A. 1st,
1911); Skaggs v. Kansas City Terminal Ry. Co., 233 Fed. 827 (W. D. Mo. 1916).
17. When, in the interpretation of a term in a federal statute, there arises a dif-
ference between general common law principles and local state law, in order to preserve
uniformity within the United States, the common law controls unless the statute ex-
pressly, or by necessary implication, depends upon local law.* Burnet v. Harmel, 287 U. S.
103 (1932), Burk-Waggoner Oil Ass'n v. Hopkins, 269 U. S. 110 (1925); Weiss v.
Wiener, 279 U. S. 333 (1929). But cf. Crooks v. Harrelson, 282 U. S. 55 (1930).
There would seem no need to extend this presumption to cages of foreign law, since
uniformity is better served by the use of the conflicts rule to prevent double taxation.
18. Since most of the countries of the world do not use the term real property, it
seems plausible that Congress, in exempting foreign realty, anticipated the use of com-
mon conflicts rules, and "intended" the words "real property" as a shorthand notation
for the analogous classification used by the law of the situs.
19. Even in American law the classification immovable may be more realistic for
tax purposes, cf. Craver's Estate, 319 Pa. 282, 179 AtI. 606 (Superior Ct. 1935> (99
year lease renewable forever'held immovable and not taxable at the domicile, although
intangible personalty).
20. For a careful analysis of the applicability of the conflicts rule, see WENoLER,
BnrrRiGE zu-,, P1bsBLEM ann INTERNATIONALE DOPpELESTEUEIN (1935) pp. 73 ct seq.
But Wengler believes that where the law of the situs possesses no comparable term
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the conflicts rule is unlikely to be adopted in the near future in the inter-
national sphere because courts are reluctant to apply foreign law in the de-
termination of revente matters, and because there is an unwillingness to
avoid international double taxation through unilateral self limitation.2 ' But
since the problem of double taxation is being approached through the use
of bilateral treaties,22 the conflicts rule may, in the future, become of great
service, as between treaty nations, in avoiding the difficulties arising from
differences in internal law.
DEFECTIVE GOODS AS A DEFENSE AGAINST A COUXMERCIAL
FACTOR OR BROKER*
MAiY DEVICES have been developed by sellers, or by their financing agen-
cies, to make the buyer's obligation to pay independent of any defenses arising
out of the contract of sale.' The trade acceptance in the. bands of a dis-
counting bank is a case in point. The commercial letter of credit functions
to the same end,2 provided only that the accompanying documents are in
order. It has been uncertain, however, in those branches of trade where
financing is done by the seller's factor or broker,3 how far this separation
of the payment obligation from questions of quantity and quality would be
allowed to go.4 A recent case in the English Court of Appeal clarifies the
point somewhat. A firm of brokers, pursuant to a del crcdcre agency con-
tract, paid the seller the full purchase price of certain goods within three
days of the delivery to them of the shipping documents, and drew their own
or where there is such a term, but the classification of the particular interest involved
is uncertain, then the law of the forum should be applied.
21. The tendency has been to expand federal taxation. Cook v. Tait, 265 U. S. 47
(1924) ; Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, Executor, 21 B. T. A. 330 (1930) ; Guaranty
Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 79 F. (2d) 245 (C.C. A. 2nd, 1935). The same has been
true of foreign countries. It re Consuelo, Dowager Duchess of Manchester, [1912] 1
Ch. 540; GUGGENE , op. cit. supra note 8, p. 51-63.
22. McCaffery, The Franco-Ainerican Convention Relathv to Double Taxation
(1936) 36 CoL. L REv. 382. The European countries are well in advance in the use
of such treaties, GUGGENEM-n, op. cit. supra note 8, p. 69 n. 1.
*Churchill and Sire v. Go ddard, 154 L. T. R. 586 (C. A. 1936).
1. See Comment (1924) 34 Y=Ar L. J. 775.
2. O'Meara v. Nat Park Bank, 239 N. Y. 3S6, 146 N. F. 636 (1925); Fnm"xssEnT,
LGAL AsPEcrs oF Commmcum Lnrrrs oF Cmmrr (1930) 224.
3. In the letter of credit transaction the issuing bank is brought into the trans-
action by the buyer. Fnrrm.szrr, op. cit. supra note 2, at 146.
4. There are, of course, many variations of the use of a commercial agent as a
financing medium, e.g., Ryttenberg v. Schefer, 131 Fed. 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1904) ; Ommen
v. Talcott, 188 Fed. 401 (C. C. A. 2d, 1911); Boise v. Talcott, 264 Fed. 61 (C. C. A.
2d, 1920); Irving Trust Co. v. Commercial Factors' Corp., 63 F. (2d) 864 (C. C.A:
2d, 1934); Irving Trust Co. v. Lindner & Bro.. Inc., 264 N. Y. 165, 190 N. F. 332
(1934) ; see Steffen and Danziger, The Rebirth of the Commercial Factor (1935) 36
CoL L R-v. 745.
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drafts on the purchaser, which were duly accepted. Despite the defective-
ness of the goods as determined upon a subsequent arbitration, the brokers
recovered against the buyer as acceptor of the drafts, the court holding that
the action had been brought by the plaintiffs not as agents or trustees of the
seller, but as holders of the accepted drafts, which, viewed in their com-
mercial setting, constituted an independent contract between plaintiffs and
defendant, its consideration, according to the court, being the transfer of
the shipping documents and not full performance of the underlying contract
of sale.5
There is little question of the power of a factor to contract in his own
name and to sue the buyer on the contract, whether the name of the
seller be disclosed or undisclosed;6 but his action is said to be subject to
the superior cause of action of his principal.. and the buyer in any such case
is entitled to defend on any ground available against the seller.8 Since the
broker,0 on the other hand, does not ordinarily appear as promisee in the
contract of sale, he generally has no action for the purchase price at all:10
the rule that such an agent may acquire a standing in court through the
acquisition of some sort of "special interest' l is not as certain as its fre-
quent statement would seem to imply. 2 Where the broker does succeed
in maintaining a suit against the buyer, moreover, defenses good against the
5. Churchill and Sim v. Goddard, 154 L. T. R. 586 (C. A. 1936), rev'g 51 T. L. R.
453 (K.B. 1935), (1935) 80 L. J. 56, (1935) 180 L.T.7.
6. Stockbarger v. Sain, 69 I1. App. 436 (1896); William R. Smith & Son v.
Bloom, 159 Iowa 592, 141 N. W. 32 (1913); Keown & Co. v. Vogel, 25 Mo. App. 35
(1887); Davis v. Harness, 38 Ohio St. 397 (1882); Progress Blue Ribbon Farms v.
Chicago Horse Sales Co., 153 Wis. 249, 140 N.W. 1132 (1913); cf. Plummer Mer-
cantile Co. v. Henderson, 37 Colo. 93, 86 Pac. 108 (1906); Ermeling v. Gibson Can-
ning Co., 105 Ill. App. 196 (1902); Owen v. Harriott, 47 Ind. App. 359, 94 N. E. 591
(1910).
7. See Beardsley v. Schmidt, 120 Wis. 405, 409, 98 N. W. 235, 236 (1904);
MEcHEm, AGENCY (2d ed. 1914) § 2037. But the principal may not defeat the agent's
suit to the extent of any lien the agent may' have. Drinklwater v. Goodwin, 1 Cowp.
251 (K. B. 1775).
8. MECHEM, op. cit. supra note 7, §2045; RESTATEmENT, AGENCY (1933) § 368;
BowsTEAD, AGENCY (8th ed. 1932) 439; cf. Grice v. Kenrick, L. R. 5 Q. B. 340 (1870).
9. The distinction between broker and factor is discussed in Graham & Co. v.
Duckwall, Fitch & Co., 8 Bush 12 (Ky. 1871); J. M. Robinson, Norton & Co. v.
Corsicana Cotton Factory, 124 Ky. 435, 102 S. W. 869 (1907).
10. White & Elder v. Chouteau, 10 Barb. 202 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1850); Fairlie v.
Fenton, L. R. 5 Ex. 169 (1870); Sharman v. Brandt, L. R. 6 Q. B. 720 (1871);
Jordeson & Co. v. London Hardwood Co., 110 L. T. R. 666 (K. B. 1913); Flatau,
Dick & Co. v. Keeping, 36 Com. Cas. 243 (C. A. 1931). But cf. Barton Thompson &
Co. v. Vigers Bros., 19 Com. Cas. 175, 110 L. T. R. 667, note a (K. B. 1906).
11. White & Elder v. Chouteau, 10 Barb. 202 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1850); Atkyns &
Batten v. Amber, 2 Esp. 493 (C. P. 1796) ; BowsTEAD, op. cit. supra note 8, at 431.
12. MEcHEm, op. cit. supra note 7, §§ 2033-2036; RESTATEMENT, AGENCY (1933)
§ 372.
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seller may be proved against him,1 3 as in the case of an action by the factor.14
These holdings are consistent with the traditional description of the com-
mercial factor or broker as assignee of the seller's claim against the buyer
for the purchase price, subject to all the defenses valid against the seller-
assignor.
An agent of the type employed in the English case, however, seems to
resemble the issuer of a letter of credit more than he does the ordinary
broker. By the practice involved both in the English case and in the letter
of credit transaction the seller contracts for payment by a third party-
the agent in the one case, the issuing bank in the other-who undertakes to
pay in cash against shipping documents,' s or at some other specified point in
the transaction, apart from the terms of the sales contract. The obligation
of the bank issuing a letter of credit to accept and pay the seller's drafts
upon receipt of the specified documents is not defeated by reason of defects
in the goods;1O nor can the buyer refuse the bank reimbursement because
the goods do not comply with contract specifications.17 In several cases prior
to the present case, on the other hand, in which similar del credere brokers,
who had paid the sellers, but had not obtained acceptances from the buyers,
sought to maintain a claim against the buyers for the price of the goods
or the return of the shipping documents, the English courts denied the
relief requested, on the ground that the plaintiffs, not being parties to the
principal contract of sale, had no standing in court against the buyers.18 It
remains to be seen whether the buyer who knows of a defect in the goods
13. Leo v. McCormack, 186 N. Y. 330, 78 N. F. 1096 (1906).
14. In many cases it is difficult to distinguish the financing agent from one who is
himself a purchaser, e.g., In re Taft, 133 Fed. 511 (C. C. A. 6th, 1904); B. F. Sturte-
vant Co. v. Cumberland Dugan & Co., 106 Md. 587, 63 At& 351 (1907); Commercial
Credit Co. v. Girard Nat. Bank, 246 Pa. 88, 92 Atl. 44 (1914); Ex taric White, 24
L. T. R. 45 (C. A. 1871). Where the agency could be considered a "veil" for a sale
to the agent, the "agent" would seem to become a principal seller clearly subject to the
defense of defectiveness of the goods.
15. Fn ms.mnS, op. cit. supra note 2, at 223.
16. O'Meara Co. v. Nat. Park Bank, 239 N. Y. 386, 146 N. E. 636 (1925); Con-
tinental Nat. Bank v. Nat City Bank of N. Y., 69 F. (2d) 312 (C. C.A. 9th, 1934).
17. First Vis. Nat. Bank v. Forsyth & Co., 189 Wis. 9, 206 N. W. 843 (1926);
FnmnT ix, op. cit. mupra note 2, at 171-172; cf. Pan-American Bank & Trust Co.
v. Nat. City Bank, 6 F. (2d) 762 (C.C. A. 2d, 1925), cert. denied, 269 U. S. 554
(1925); Farmers' Bank v. Stapleton, 118 Kan. 755, 236 Pac. 828 (1925); Tocco v.
Bank of Italy, 249 Mass. 267, 143 N. E. 905 (1924); Camp v. Corn Exchange Nat.
Bank, 285 Pa. 337, 132 At. 189 (1926).
18. Jordeson & Co. v. London Hardwood Co., 110 L. T. R. 666 (K. B. 1913);
Flatau, Dick & Co. v. Keeping, 36 Com. Cas. 243 (C. A. 1931) (Scrutton, J.). But
cf. Barton Thompson & Co. v. Vgers Bros., 19 Com. Cas. 175, 110 L. T. R. 667, note a
(K. B. 1906). All these cases, like the principal case, seem to have arisen in the Anglo-
Baltic lumber trade. The argument does not seem to have been made that the brokers
might sue as third party beneficiaries of the contract of sale, under ,which the buyers
obligated themselves to pay by accepting, upon receipt of shipping documents, drafts
drawn either by the sellers or by their authorized agents.
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can now refuse to accept a draft proffered with proper documents by a factor
who claims, under the instant case, to be an independent financial agent en-
titled to be paid, by the usage contemplated in the sales contract, without
reference to defenses good against the seller. For it was the "independent" 19
contract between brokers and buyer, consummated with the acceptance by
the buyer of the bill of exchange drawn against him by the brokers, which
led the court, in the instant case, to the same result generally attained in the
letter of credit cases- that questions concerning quality of the merchandise
must be separately settled between seller and buyer after the financing medium
has been made whole.
Under the English decision, then, the agent, upon the buyer's acceptance of
his bill, apparently becomes more than a mere assignee of the seller with re-
spect to the claim for the purchase price. His position is evidently regarded
as being more analogous to that of the bank which has discounted the seller's
draft upon the buyer, taking the attached bill of lading as collateral security.20
If the buyer refuses to accept, the bank may charge the item back to the
seller's account.21 Having accepted, however, the buyer may not subsequent-
ly refuse payment to the bank because of dissatisfaction with the goods.22
While the agent who draws his own drafts on the buyer, as in the English
case, does not occupy the position of the discounting bank as a holder in due
course, he is performing the same banking function in the matter of pay-
19. Churchill and Sine v. Goddard, 154 L. T. R. 586, 588 (C. A. 1936).
20. Lewis Leonhardt & Co. v. W. H. Small & Co., 117 Tenn. 153, 96 S. W. 1051
(1906) ; ZoLLM.ANx, BANs AM BANKING (1936) § 5495. The bank is generally made
the payee of the bill. Although the House of Lords has held that the payee of a bill
of exchange cannot be a holder in due course [Jones, Ltd. v. Waring & Gillow, Ltd.,
[1926] A. C. 670, (1927) 40 HAv.'L. :Rv. 494; for the American cases see BRANNAN,
NrEaoTIABn. IN STRUMENTS LAw (5th ed. 1932) 487-502], the question seems never to
have been decided in an action by payee against acceptor [see Comment (1927) 36 YALE
L. J. 1005].
21. American Trust & Savings Bank v. Gueder & Paeschke Mfg. Co., 150 IlI. 336,
37 N. E. 227 (1894); Noble v. Doughten, 72 Kan. 336, 83 Fac. 1048 (1905); cf.
Shapiro Bros. Factors' Corp. v. Cherokee Silk Corp., 114 N. J. L. 356, 176 Ati. 893
(1935).
22. Flournoy v. First Nat. Bank of Jeffersonville, 78 Ga. 222, 2 S. V. 547 (1887);
Arpin v. Owens, 140 Mass. 144, 3 N. E. 25 (1885). Even complete failure of consider-
ation between drawer and drawee is not a defense against the payee bank which has
discounted. Goetz v. Bank of Kansas City, 119 U. S. 551 (1886) ; cf. Hoffman & Co. v.
Bank of Milwaukee, 12 Wall. 181 (U. S. 1870). Nor, if the drafts are paid, may the
purchaser garnishee the bank in an action against the seller. Fourth Nat. Bank oE
Cincinnati v. Mayer, 89 Ga. 108, 14 S. E. 891 (1892) ; Vickers v. Machinery Warehouse
and Sales Co., 111 Wash. 576, 191 Pac. 869 (1920); ZoLL-MA, op. cit. supra note 20,
§ 5497. Contra: J. C. Haas & Co. v. Citizens' Bank, 144 Ala. 562, 39 So. 129 (1905) ;
Searles Bros. v. Smith Grain Co., 80 Miss. 688, 32 So. 287 (1902); Finch v. Gregg,
126 N. C. 176, 35 S. E. 251 (1900) ; Landa v. Lattin Bros., 19 Tex. Civ. App. 246, 16
S. W. 48 (1898). The rule of the cases contra has been held no longer tenable with
respect to interstate transactions because of the Fk-muL BiuL oF LADINa AcM, 39 STAT.
538 (1916), 49 U.S.C. §§ 81-124 (1934). First Nat. Bank of Ripley v. Tchula Com-
mercial Co., 132 Miss. 58, 95 So. 742 (1923).
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ment 2 and the independence of that activity should not be obscured by the
fact that he may also be engaged in the business of making sales contracts.
This being true, the result is that English law-this time with respect to the
factor or broker-has taken one more step looking toward greater liquidity
of money obligations.24
SUBROGATION OF INSURER UNDER VOIR-XMEN'S COMPENSATION LAWS*
IN THE few states' where Workmen's Compensation statutes define neither
the rights of reimbursement of an insurer who has paid a statutory award
to an employee injured in the course of his employment by the negligence
of a third person, nor the manner in which these rights may be enforced,^
the courts tend to hold, analogizing Workmen's Compensation insurance to
life. and accident insurance, that neither the employer nor the insurer is
subrogated to the injured workman's claim against the tortfeasor.3 Since the
amount payable by the insurer is a fixed sum based primarily on the aver-
age earnings of the employee 4 and not an actual measure of his loss, the
element of indemnity, which seems to decide the availability of subrogation
in this field,5 is not apparent.6 Counter argument has been made, however,
23. This has been recognized, however, as not subjecting the financial agent to the
banking laws. In re Worth Lighting and Fixture Co., Inc., 292 Fed. 769 (S. D.
N. Y. 1923).
24. See Bmuz & PEDaasoi, Lrjum CLAus AmD NAToirAL WATHt (1934) c. 10.
*Globe Indemnity Co. v. Atlantic Lighterage Corp., 271 N. Y. 234, 2 N. E. (2d)
640 (1936).
I. The statutes of New Hampshire, Ohio, and West Virginia contain no provisions.
N. 11 PuB. LAws (1926) c. 178; O3no Grr. Con Ar. (Page, 1926) § 1465-37;
OF cAL CODE oF W. Va. (1931) c. 23.
2. See AssoCIATioN or CASUaLTY ma Sup=-n EXECUTIvE , DIGESTr OF nr0eH'S
ComENSATiox LAWs IN THE UNITED STATES AND TErIToRIEs (12th ed. 1931) §32;
2 ScHNEIDER, WoRmm'es ComENSATioN LAw (2d ed. 1932) §466; (1933) 17 Mnum.
L. REv. 828; (1934) 83 A. L. R. 665.
3. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 204 S. W. 376 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918)
[statute amended in 1917 to cover the situation. Tz. AmT. REv. Cm' STAT. (Vernon,
1925) art. 8307, § 6a] ; Merrill v. Marietta Torpedo Co., 79 W. Va. 669, 92 S. F 112
(1917) ; (1929) 29 COL. L. Ray. 1167.
4. 2 ScEr=DER, Worxwman's CozmrmsATiON LAw (2d ed. 1932) c. MX.
5. St. Louis, Iron Mnt. & So. R. R. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 139 U. S. 223
(1890); V.xcE, INsuRANcE (2d ed. 1930) 679.
6. See City of Austin v. Johnson, 204 S. 'V. 1181, 1183 (Tex. Civ. App. 1918);
Fox v. Dallas Hotel, 111 Tex. 461, 472, 240 S. V. 517, 520 (1922); Mercer v. Ott,
73 W. Va. 629, 638, 89 S. E. 952, 955 (1916); Merrill v. Marietta Torpedo Co., 79
IV. Va. 669, 679, 92 S. E. 112, 116 (1917) ; cf. Interstate Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Pub. Service
Elec. Co., 86 N. J. L. 26, 90 Ati. 1062 (Sup. Ct. 1914) ; 1 CA rpnan, Won xur's Comr-
PENsATioiN (1935) § 30; (1929) 29 Cr- L. Rav. 1167; (1925) 33 HAnv. L REv. 971.
It is true, however, that by the terms of his contract the insurer indemnifies the employer
for any award the latter has to pay, but the insurer in suing the tortfeasor is seeing
to be subrogated ultimately not to any right of action of the employer, but to that of
the employee. This situation is to be contrasted with the one presented when the
employer is subrogated by statute to the employee's cause of action. See note 21 infra.
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that the insurer, by compensating the employee for a limited portion of his
loss of capacity to work, is indemnifying him up to that amount in a manner
analogous to that of one who indemnifies an insured, under a fire insurance
policy, for a part of the ascertainable loss.' Attempts at distinctions on the
point, however, are inconclusive, for Workmen's Compensation so resembles
life and accident insurance on the one hand and indemnity insurance on the
other that it is impossible to classify it unqualifiedly with either type. The
matter should be analyzed independently in terms of the judicial policy of
subrogation, which is rooted in the eqdity desire to prevent unjust enrich-
ment. And since a disabled employee's total actual loss is usually incapable
of definite evaiuation, it is impossible to say with any conviction that the
employee who recovers in full both from his employer and from a third
party tortfeasor is being unjustly enriched.8
Ordinarily this problem does not arise, however, for the insurer's rights
of subrogation are explicitly defined in the statutes.0 Occasional difficulties,
nevertheless, still persist, like the determination of the measure of recovery
and the procedural -problem of the proper party to bring action. In states
in which the election by the employee to receive compensation.not only bars
any further action by him but deprives him of all interest in the amount
recovered, 10 the insurer may recover only the amount of compensation he
has paid,1 although New York had a contrary rule before its statute was
amended.12 Likewise the majority of courts have held that the employee,'
7. See Hardman, Common Law Right of .Subrogation Under Workmcn's Coin-
pensation Acts (1920) 26 W. VA. L. Q. 183.
8. See Suttles v. Railway Mail Ass'n, 156 App. Div. 435, 437, 141 N. Y. Supp. 1024,
1026 (1913); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. J. B. Parker & Co., 96 Tex. 287, 292, 72 S.W.
621, 622 (1902); Gatzweiler v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 136 Wis. 34, 38,
116 N. W. 633, 634 (1908); see VAxcE, INsua .xCz (2d ed. 1930) 672, 679. Quite
apart from the principle of subrogation, however, there is some authority for the view
that the insurer should be allowed to recover despite the absence of statutory provisions,
because his injury is the direct and forseeable consequence of the tortfeasor's negligence.
Staples v. Central Surety Corp., 62 F. (2d) 650 (C. C. A. 10th, 1932); see Travelers'
Ins. Co. v. Great Lakes Eng. Co., 184 Fed. 426, 431 (C. C. A. 6th, 1911); cf. Dayton
Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., 287 Fed. 439 (C. C. A. 6th, 1923); VANCE,
INsuRANcE (2d ed. 1930) 680, n. 74. Contra: Interstate Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Public
Service Elec. Co., 86 N. J. L. 26, 90 At. 1062 (1914); see Connecticut Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 25 Conn. 265, 274, 65 Am. Dec. 571, 576 (1856).
9. See note 2, supra.'
10. For example, see AMz. Rxv. CODE ANx. (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 1435; COLO.
Comp. LAws (1921) §4461; N. M. STAT. ANN. (Courtright, 1929) §156-124; ONLL.
STAT. (Harlow, 1931) § 13368. All of these statutes subrogate the employer as well
as the insurer, but for the purposes of this' note the right of only the insurer will be
considered.
11. Ridley v. United Sash and Door Co., 98 Okla. 80, 224 Pac. 351 (1924);
American Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Otis Elevator Co., 160 Tenn. 248, 23 S. W. (2d)
245 (1930); Corrigan v. Stormont, 160 Va. 727, 170 S. E. 16 (1933).
12. Travelers' Insurance Co. v. Brass Goods Mfg. Co., 239 N. Y. 273, 146 N. E.
377 (1925); see Phoenix Indemnity Co. v. Staten Island Ry., 251 N. Y. 127, 136,
167 N. E. 194, 197 (1929). Statute amended in 1935 stipulating that any damages in
being without any interest, is not a proper party plaintiff and therefore that
the insurer must bring the action in his own name.13 In most states, how-
ever, the statutory transfer to the insurer of the employee's cause of action,
while complete, does not cut off the interest of the employee absolutely,
for the employee is allowed any excess the insurer recovers above the amount
of compensation paid.' 4 Some courts under such statutes allow the insurer
to sue in his own name on the ground that the insurer has succeeded to
the employee's complete cause of action. Usually, however, actions are
brought either in the name of the employee'0 or by joining him as plaintiff,' 7
and although the former practice is objectionable as requiring litigation in
the name of parties other than the real party in interest, it is justified prac-
tically by the fact that the employee's interest in the recovery of damages
above the amount of compensation might be prejudiced by any mention of
the insurer.
A few statutes, making no reference to the insurer, provide only for sub-
rogation of the employer to the employee's cause of action, and require him
to hold any recovery above the amount of compensation in trust for the
employee.'8 Under such circumstances the insurer should be permitted to
assert the injured workman's cause of action, since the insurer, by promis-
ing to indemnify the employer fully for any compensation he has to pay,
is entitled, in the absence of statute, to be subrogated pro tanto to the rights
of the employer, who in turn is subrogated by statute to'the rights of the
excess of the amount of compensation be paid to the employer. N. Y. Woru n ix's
Co PNsATO= LAw § 29.
13. Moseley v. Lily Ice Cream Co., 38 Ariz. 417, 300 Pac. 958 (1931); Lang v.
Brooklyn City R. Co., 247 N. Y. 551, 161 N. E. 178 (1928) ; Bellanger v. Econ. Engin.
Co. and Lib. Mut. Ins. Co., 245 App. Div., SS9, 282 N. Y. Supp. 325 (3d Dep't 1935) ;
Eagle-Picher Lead Co. v. Kirby, 109 Okla. 96, 235 Pac. 176 (1925); cf. Ohmulgee
Supply Co. v. Rotman, 144 Okla. 293, 291 Pac. 1 (1930).
14. For e-xample, see LAws or Dr.. (1917) 3193 11. § 131; FL,. CoUT. Gr-.
LAWs ANN. (Skillman, Supp. 1936) §5966(38); iAss. Gair. LAWs (1932) c. 152,
§ 15; N. Y. Wo zne's CouPENsATzo LAw § 29; N. C. CoDE ANIT. (MichiC, 1935)
§ 8031 (r); N. D. Coup. LAws Anx. (Supp. 1925) § 396a 20; Acrs or S. C. (1936)
art 610, § 11; TEx. ANN. Rav. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1925) art. 8307 § 6a.
15. The Kokusai Risen Kabuskiki Kaisha, 44 F. (2d) 659 (S. D. Te.'. 1930).
Some statutes expressly permit him to do so. See, for example, Acrs OF S. C. (1936)
art. 610 § 11; S. D. Coup. LAws (1929) § 9446.
16. Berry v. Irwin, 224 Ky. 565, 6 S. NV. (2d) 705 (1928); Chaves v. Weels,
242 Mass. 156, 136 N. E. 73 (1922) ; Becker v. Eastera Mass. St. Ry., 279 Mass. 435,
181 N. E. 757 (1932).
17. Prigden v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 203 N. C. 62, 164 S. B. 325 (1932).
Especially if the courts hold that the statute does not deprive the employee of a right
of action against the third person for damages in excess of the compensation received.
Scott v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 333 -o. 374, 62 S. NV. (2d) 834 (1933). If the employee
is not joined as party plaintiff an objection may be raised that there is a split in the
cause of action. See note 25 infra.
18. For example, see the LoNGSHOREMan'S AND IHnAoR ,VoRnMs' CoMENsATIo:r
Acr 44 STAT. 1440 (1927), 33 U. S. C.A. § 933 (Supp. 1936) ; IwAmo CODa Aza. (1932)
§ 43-1004; MicH. Comp. LAws (1929) § 8454; PA. STAT. Amr. (Purdon, 1930) tit. 77,
§ 671.
19371 NOTES 697
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
employee.10 The accident insurance analogy is therefore not applicable to
statutes of this type, but at least one court has by virtue of that analogy
refused to subrogate the insurer.20
But even if the subrogation issue is decided in the insurer's favor, and
the majority of courts so decide,21 a special procedural difficulty is .created
by statutes of the type last discussed, where the insurer is subrogated only
to so much of the cause of action against the tortfeasor as is covered by its
contract indemnifying the employer. The remainder of the cause of action
belongs to the employer who by the express terms of many statutes is the
only party who can recover any excess over the amount of compensation
paid. Thus when an insurer under the Federal Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act 22 brought an action for damages in its own
name against the tortfeasor, alleging to be subrogated to all the rights of
the employer, the court, in dismissing the complaint, stated that the em-
ployer must either bring the suit or be made a party to it in order to avoid
subjecting the tortfeasor to two suits on the same operative facts.23 Although
the rule against thus splitting a cause of action has been invoked before to
prevent a suit in the name of an insurer who had paid only a portion of the
total award,24 it has not been employed heretofore to bar an insurer who
has paid the whole award but who by statute is unable to recover the excess
from the tortfeasor.2 5 The rule is most frequently applied in situations in
which an employee is killed by the negligence of a third person, and the
19. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Moses, 287 U. S. 530, 541 (1931); 2 ScUNEIDER,
WOREcmEN'S C mPFNSATi N LAw (2d ed. 1932) § 458.
20. See Marshall-Jackson Co. v. Jeffery, 167 Wis. 63, 69, 166 N. W. 647, 650 (1918);
(1932) 26 ILL. L. REv. 831, 833.
21. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Moses, 287 U. S. 530 (1931); Workmen's Compen. Exch.
v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R., 45 F. (2d) 885 (D. Idaho 1930); Lincoln Park Coal
Co. v. Wabash Ry., 338 Ill. 82, 170 N. E. 8 (1930), (1932) 26 ILL. L. Ray. 831; see
City of Red Wing v. Eichinger, 163 Minn. 54, 56, 203 N. W. 622, 623 (1925); cf.
Donahue v. Thorndike and Hix, Inc., 119 Me. 20, 109 Atl. 187 (1920) (term "employer"
as used in the Act includes the insurer).
22. 44 STAT. 1440 (1927), 33 U.S.C. §933 (1934).
23. Globe Indemnity Co. v. Atlantic Lighterage Corp., 271 N. Y. 234, 2 N. E.- (2d)
640 (1936). Contra: Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Lee and Simmons, 241 App. Div. 835, 271
N. Y. Supp. 239 (2d Dep't 1934) (overruled by principal case).
24. Maryland Casualty Co. of Baltimore v. Cincinnati, C., C. & St. L. Ry., 74 Ind.
App. 272, 124 N. E. 774 (1919); see Powell & Powell v. Wake Water Co., 171 N. C.
290, 296, 88 S. E. 426, 430 (1916) ; CLARM, CODE PLEADING (1928) § 24.
25. By the terms of many Acts the election by the employee to receive compensation
does not deprive him of the right to sue the tortfeasor for damages in excess of the
amount of compensation, and since the insurer is given the right to sue for the amount
of compensation, in order to prevent double suits it is provided that the party who first
sues must notify the other, who may then join in the action. See, for example, CoNN.
GENr. STAT. (1930) §5231; LA. GEa. STAT. ANN. (Dart, 1932) §4397; Fidelity Union
Casualty Co. v. Carpenter, 12 La. App. 321, 125 So. 504 (1929). For a discussion of
the common law rules against splitting a cause of action, see (1936) 10 ST. Jonzes L.
REV. 344. For a dictum to the effect that the Workmen's Compensatiohi Acts supersede
the rule against splitting a cause of action, see Kandelin v. Lee Moor Contracting Co.,
37 N. M. 479, 488, 24 P. (2d) 731, 736 (1933).
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class of dependents who are entitled to and who have elected to receive
compensation under the Act, thereby transferring theii cause of action to
the insurer, is more restricted than the class permitted to share in the
recovery under the death statute. In order to prevent a splitting of the cause
of action, the majority of courts hold that, since the dependents who did not
receive compensation are not deprived of their right to recover under the
death statute, the insurer cannot sue in its own name but must prose-
cute its claim, through an action brought by the executor or representative
of the deceased 6 Some courts likewise permit only one suit but hold that
acceptance of compensation prohibits any action under the death statute,
regardless of the dissimilarity between the beneficiaries under the two
statutes.2 7 In the instant case the only way the court could obviate the pos-
sibility of a split in the cause of action would be to allow subrogation of
the insurer to all the rights of the employer, permitting recovery of full
damages and directing that any excess above the amount of compensation
be held in trust for the employee. This procedure, however, would constitute
a considerable deviation from orthodox doctrine.P Furthermore, it would
not preclude a second suit against the tortfeasor by the employer who, not
being a party to the first suit, would not be bound by the judgment. It is,
therefore, particularly desirable that the omission of the insurer's name in
the terms of the statute be cured by legislative rather than judicial action.
APPELLATE REVIEW OF INCONSISTENT FINDINGS AND JUDGIEITS"'
IN SEPARATE actions brought by two plaintiffs in different trial courts for
damages caused by the breaking of an aqueduct maintained by the City of
Los Angeles, the two courts, sitting without juries, made opposite findings
of fact with respect to the defendant's negligence on substantially the same
evidence and entered judgments accordingly. Both judgments were affirmed
by different intermediate courts of review. The Supreme Court of California,
considering the cases together on further appeal, adopted the opinion of
the intermediate appellate court which affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff,
and reversed the other. In this "anomalous" situation, the court held, it was
not bound by the findings of fact of the respective trial courts, but could
26. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. American Incin. Co., 51 F. (2d) 739 (S. D. N. Y.
1931); Streeter v. Graham and Norton Co., 144 Misc. Rep. 516, 259 N. Y. Supp. 14
(Sup. Ct 1932); cf. Doleman v. Levine, 295 U. S. 221 (1935), (1936) 10 ST. Jomi's
L. REv. 344.
27. Moore v. Christiensen S. S. C6., 53 F. (2d) 299 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931); ree
Georgia Casualty Co. v. Haygood, 210 Ala. 56, 61, 97 So. 87, 91 (1923). Accord:
Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Louis Padula Co., 224 N. Y. 397, 121 N. E. 348 (1918). Confra:
Brown v. Southern Ry., 202 N. C. 256, 162 S. . 613 (1932).
28. Subrogation extends only to the amount the insurer is compelled to pay. Hall
& Long v. Railroad Companies, 13 Wall. 367 (U. S. 1871).
*Southern Pacific Co. v. Los Angeles, 5 Cal. (2d) 545, 55 P. (2d) 847 (193);
Inyo Chemical Co. v. Los Angeles, 5 CaL (2d) 525, 55 P. (2d) 850 (1936).
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determine the "legal issue" of whether "legal responsibility" should be im-
posed.-
Inconsistent findings of fact made by court or jury in support of a single
judgment may be resolved on appeal, if the discrepancy is not too serious,
by calling one finding harmless error;2 or certain of the findings may be
discounted and the judgment affirmed by resorting to the traditional pre-
sumption in favor of the judgment of a court of general jurisdiction.3 When
the findings are wholly irreconcilable, the appellate court may remand for
a new trial.4 -Jury findings in equity, being only advisory, may, when they
conflict with those of the chancellor, simply be ignored.5 Reconciliation of
the findings of fact in support of a single judgment is most difficult in the
review of inconsistent verdicts against the master and in favor of the servant
in joint actions for damages allegedly due to the negligence of the latter;O
particularly is this so in the usual case where the master alone appeals and
the plaintiff pursues the servant no further, so that the appellate court can-
not remand for a new trial against both defendants. Certain courts, finding
some evidence of negligence against the master, affirm;7 others, holding
that the master cannot be liable without the servant, reverse.8 Judgments
on verdicts against the master, without mention of the servant, have several
times been sustained on the ground that the plaintiff alone is aggrieved, and
not the defendant, when the jury can agree on the liability of only one of
two joint tortfeasors.9
Similar inconsistencies in separate actions by different plaintiffs involving
substantially the same subject matter, as in the California case, present a
different problem.' 0 Since the reviewing court theoretically has no power
1. Ibid., (-1936) 24 CALm. L. Rlv. 733.
2. Epstein v. Gradowitz, 76 Cal. App. 29, 243 Pac. 877 (1925); Register Life Ins.
Co. v. Kenniston, 99 Mont. 191, 43 P. (2d) 251 (1935).
3. Grignon's Lessee v. Astor, 2 How. 319 (U. S. 1844); Hotaling v. Hotaling,
193 Cal. 368, 224 Pac. 455 (1924). The New York courts, however, interpret the find-
ings in the light more favorable to the appellant. Elterman v. Hyman, 192 N. Y. 113,
84 N. E. 937 (1908).
4. Hollywood Cleaning & Pressing Co. v. Hollywood Laundry Service, 217 Cal.
131, 17 P. (2d) 712 (1932); Lanning v. Trenton & Mercer County Traction Corp.,
3 N. J. Misc. 1006, 130 Atl. 444, (Sup. Ct. 1925).
5. Simon Newman Co. v. Woods, 85 Cal. App. 360, 259 Pac. 460 (1927).
6. See Comment (1932) 45 HA.iv. L. Rnv. 1230.
7. Strickfaden v. Green Creek Highway Dist., 42 Idaho 738, 248 Pac. 456 (1926);
Curtis v. Puget Sound Bridge & Dredging Co., 133 Wash. 323, 233 Pac. 936 (1925).
And cf. Stuart v. Standard Oil Co. of Ind., 211 Mo. App. 345, 244 S. W. 970 (1922)
(only master, not servant, held liable for nonfeasance, as distinct from misfeasance).
No independent negligence on the part of the master by reason of his choice of servants
entered into these cases.
8. Larson v. Hines, 220 Ill. App. 594 (1921) ; Ind. Nitroglycerine & Torpedo Co.
v. Lippencott Glass Co., 165 Ind. 361, 75 N. E. 649 (1905); Sparks v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. R., 104 S. C. 266, 88 S. E. 739 (1916).
9. Ill. C. R. R. v. Murphy's Adm'r, 123 Ky. 787, 97 S. W. 729 (1906); see
Dunbaden v. Castles Ice Cream Co. 103 N. J. L. 427, 429, 135 Atl. 886, 887 (1927).
10. See Vaniewsky v. Demarest Bros. Co., 106 N. 3. L. 34, 37, 148 Atl. 17, 18
(Sup. Ct. 1929), affd, 107 N. J. L. 389, 154 Atl. 623 (1931); Comment (1932)
45 HAav. L. REv. 1230, 1233. For discussions of the Dorranze cases, in which it was
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to substitute its own judgment on conflicting evidence for that of the finder
of facts below, it would seem conceptually correct for both judgments to
be affirmed on separate appeals on the ground that there is sufficient evidence
to support either conclusion." Here too, however, several devices have been
employed to reconcile the two judgments. Where at least one of the actions
has resulted in a dismissal, nonsuit or directed verdict, the task is facilitated.
The appellate court can simply affirm the order or judgment in that action
and reverse the judgment for the opposing party, however entered, in the
other proceeding, on the ground that the legal liability or non-liability of
the defendant under the facts involved in both actions has been correctly
decided as a matter of law in the former case."- If one of the actions has
resulted in a dismissal, nonsuit or directed verdict which has been affirmed
on appeal before the other action comes before the same or another appel-
late court, a reversal of the judgment for the opposing party in the second
action can be based squarely on the doctrine of starc dccisis.P
Where, as in the present case, both judgments have originally been entered
on jury verdicts or on independent findings by courts sitting alone, it
suggested that conflicting decisions by the courts of New Jersey and Pennsylvania on
the question of Dorrance's domicile violated constitutional immunities, see Chafee, The
Federal Interpleader Act of 1936: II (1936) 45 YAn= L. J. 1161, 1169-1176; (1934)
34 CoL. L, REv. 1151, 1374.
11. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Md. v. Lehigh Valley R. R, 275 Fed. 922 ( C. A.
3d, 1921); Akers v. Fulkerson, 153 Ky. 228, 154 S. NV. 1101 (1913); Canadian &
American Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Edinburgh-American Land Mortgage Co., 16 Te.
Civ. App. 520, 42 S. IV. 864 (1897); Board of Education v. Wright-Osborn Co.,
49 Utah 453, 164 Pac. 1033 (1917). In Barbee v. Farmers' Bank of Polo, 240 Mo.
297, 144 S. W. 839 (1912), however, the reviewing court refused to be bound by the
findings of a trial judge conflicting with those made by another judge on the same
evidence in a former case which had previously been affirmed by the same reviewing
court
Although verdicts or findings may be upheld in a civil suit which are contrary
to those made on the same issues in a criminal action [Quatray v. Wic:er, 16 La.
App. 515, 134 So. 313 (1931); Sorbello v. Mangino, 103 N. J. Eq. 292, 155 Ati. 6
(Ch. 1931). Contra: Eagle, Star & British Dominions Ins. Co. v. Heller, 149 Va. 82,
140 S. F. 314 (1927), (1928) 6 N. C. L. REv. 333], the situation is not the same as
that involving two civil actions, because of the different rules of evidence and burden
of proof involved [see Note (1924) 31 A. L. R. 264]. But in two criminal actions an
accessory before or after the fact may be found guilty even though another jury has
previously determined the innocence of the alleged principal, for the second jury may
have reached a different conclusion regarding the innocence of the principal. Common-
wealth v. Long, 246 Ky. 809, 56 S. NV. (2d) 524 (1933); see Comment (1931) 25
Iu. L. REV. 845.
12. Rosenthal v. N. Y., S. & W. R. L, 112 App. Div. 431, 98 N. Y. Supp. 476
(1st Dep't 1906) ; cf. Liberty Ins. Co. v. Central Vt. R., 19 App. Div. 509, 46 X. M
Supp. 576 (3d Dep't 1897).
13. Mercier v. Yazoo & M. V. R. R., 140 La. 644, 73 So. 710 (1916); Scott v.
King, 51 App. Div. 619, 64 N. Y. Supp. 626 (3d Dep't 1900); Cawley v. La Crosse
City Ry., 106 Wis. 239, 82 N. V. 197 (1900). But see Backman v. Rodgers, 153 App.
Div. 299, 302, 138 N. Y. Supp. 29, 32 (2d Dep't 1912); cf. F. B. Vandegrift & Co.
v. United States, 173 Fed. 609 (C. C. A. 3d, 1909). The doctrine of res judicala is,
of course, limited to actions between the same parties or their privies. 2 FhXMLAIg,
JuE NmTs (5th ed. 1925) §9 630, 371.
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may be more difficult to discover an element which can be labeled a question
of law on the basis of which to resolve the inconsistency. 4 The conflict in
this case, however, might have been resolved without reference to the law-
fact distinction. The Supreme Court of California has the power by statute
to review findings of fact made by a trial court sitting without a jury15 Al-
though that statute has been held inapplicable to findings based on conflicting
evidence,16 it might well have been utilized under the peculiar circumstances
of the present case, where the court held that the evidence in neither of
the trials below was in substantial conflict.17 Alternatively, the court might
have remanded both cases for retrial in a consolidated action. Many of the
statutes governing consolidation embody the strict common law requisites
that the actions must be pending in the same court at the same time between
the same parties and must be based upon causes of action which might have
been joined.18 But others, like the California act, allow consolidation when-
ever, in the discretion of the court, it would not prejudice a substantial right.10
And, although the cases were originally tried in different counties, consolida-
tion of such actions has been permitted in New York under a statute similar
to that in California.20
14. For a discussion of the hazy distinction between questions of fact and of law
'see ARNOLD & JAmEs, CASES ON TRIALS, JUDGMENTS AND APiPALS (1936) 132, 133;
THAYE, EVIDENCE (1898) 202; (1924) 2 TEx. L. Rlv. 361. In the instant case, even
if the facts were substantially undisputed, as the court stated, the possibility of differ-
ent inferences to be drawn therefrom would seem to make the question one of fact
rather than of law. Wilbur v. Wilbur, 197 Cal. 1, 239 Pac. 332 (1925).
15. CAL. CODE CIV. PRoc. (Deering, 1933) § 956a. -
16. Tupman v. Haberkern, 208 Cal. 256, 280 Pac. 970 (1929) ; see Comment (1932)
20 C.ur. L. REv. 171.
17. The note on this case in (1936) 24 C.ALu. L. REv. 733 assumes that the court
was acting under its statutory power, but the court in its opinion makes no mention
of the statute, and the coures language, while vague, implies that it was reviewing
an error of law and not of fact.
18. M oNT. REv. CODES ANN. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) § 9820; Nsv. ComP.
LAws (Hillyer, 1929) § 9025; N. D. Coa. LAws ANN (1913) § 7965; ORE. CODE
ANt. (1930) § 7-104; UTAH REV. STAT. ANN. (1933) § 104-54-12.
19. CA.- CODE Civ. PRoc. (Deering, 1933) § 1048; N. Y. Civ. PAc. Acr. § 96;
cf. ARE. DiG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) § 1081; N. M. STAT. ANTI. (Court-
right, 1929) § 105-828; see Realty Construction & Mortgage Co. v. Superior Court,
165 Cal. 543, 547, 132 Pac. 1048, 1049 (1913).
20. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 96; Lee v. Schmeltzer, 229 App. Div. 206, 242 N. Y.
Supp. 34 (1st Dep't 1930). Consolidation in the proper sense, whereby several actions
are combined into one in which a single judgment is rendered, is generally governed
by statute (see notes 18, 19, szpra). There are also two alternative devices, sometimes
improperly termed consolidation: the procedure in equity whereby several suits are
ordered to be tried together, each, however, retaining its separate character and requir-
ing entry of a separate judgment [Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. of N. Y. v. Lehigh
Valley R. R., 94 N. J. L. 236, 109 Atl. 743 (1920)]; and so-called "quasi-consolida-
tion," whereby all but one of the actions are stayed pending the trial of one, the
judgment in which is conclusive as to the others. See generally Lumiansky v. Tessier,
213 Mass. 182, 188, 99 N. E. 1051, 1053 (1912) ; Azinger v. Pa. R. R., 262 Pa. 242,
245, 105 Atl. 87, 88 (1918).
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THE ScoPE oF THE ATToRiqEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGEP
THE ComoN-LAw privilege of non-disclosure accorded communications
between an attorney and his client,' is now generally embodied in statutes;2
which have repeatedly been qualified by narrow constructions: and restrictive
rules of interpretation. Thus the client must intend the communication to be
confidential,4 and the protection of the privilege is withdrawn if the intention
of confidence is terminated either expressly by waiver,5 or impliedly by what
is vaguely referred to as "waiver by implication"0 or "exceptions of neces-
sity." 7 Furthermore protection is consistently refused by the courts regard-
less of the intention of the client if the communication sought to be privileged
was incidental to a fraud or crime about to be perpetrated.8 A recent case
suggests a further limitation on the scope of the privilege rule.0 A client-
witness, after suit was brought against him by his daughter, injured while
a passenger in a vehicle operated by him, conferred with the attorney for his
insurance company. _Subsequently, the insurer disclaimed liability, and a
judgment was obtained against the client-witness. When an execution Wvas
issued and returned unsatisfied, the plaintiff daughter brought the present
*Shafer v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co., 248 App. Div. 279, 299 N. Y. Supp. 577
(4th Dep't 1936).
1. See 5 WiGmoRE, EvmBnce (2d ed. 1923) § 2290.
2. The statutes have been collected in 5 WiGuor, EvIDEcE §2292, n. 1; see
also WixuoRE, EvmrcE (Supp. 1934) § 2292, n. 1.
3. Much litigation has developed, for e.-mmple, in determining whether the pro-
fessional relation exists [5 Wi-mo-0, Evm nCE §§2296, 2300-2304; WisuonE, Evz-Ezcz
(Supp. 1934) § 2303; (1925) 25 CoL L RLv. 845], and whether the word "communica-
tion' in the statute includes only the utterances of the client. 5 WIozuorm, Ev Icz
§2306; WixmoRa, EvImExcE (Supp. 1934) §2306.
4. 5 WxVGuoRE, EVmEncE §§2311, 2314; Wi uoRE, Evmmzcc (Supp. 1934) §§2311,
2314. See Comment (1926) 40 HAuv. L. Rnv. 114 (testamentary dispositions).
5. See Blackburn v. Crawfords, 3 Wall. 175, 194 (U. S. 1865).
6. See 5 ,ViGuoRE, EvmancE §2327; ,VrGonx, Evxasuce (Supp. 1934) §2327,
n. 3; Spalding, The Uncertain State of the Law ar to Wai'er of Professional Prvilege
as to Confidential Communications (1935) 20 MAss. L. Q. 16. Cf. Emory, Waihr of
Patient' Privfleges (1931) 6 WAsn. L. Rnv. 71; Comment (1932) 20 CAn. L. ITRv.
302; (1936) 31 Imi L. RLT. 134.
7. 5 JoNas, Co-.xawrAmEs on EvinnucE (2d ed. 1926) § 2164.
8. 5 WIGmpEFa EvIDENcE §2298; WiGuxom, EvmincE (Supp. 1934) §2298; 5
Jox-s, op. cit. mpra note 7, § 2161; see also Nadler v. Warner Co., 321 Pa. 139, 184
AtI. 3 (1936). Although the reason for this principle is said to be that such subjects.
are not within the professional character of a lawyer [Standard Fire Insurance Co. v.
Smithhart, 183 Ky. 679, 211 S. NV. 441, 5 A. L. R. 977 (1919)] the basis of the e.ception
is probably the preponderance of the public interest in disclosure over the public interest
in preserving the privacy of the relationship. See Annesley v. Earl of Anglesea, 17
How. St. Tr. 1140, 1243 (1743); McMaster's Trial, 9 Amer. St. Tr. S61, 871 (1872).
Compare the status of the medical privilege in criminal proceedings. Note (1926) 45
A. L. R. 1357; Legis. (1933) 31 U. oF PA. L. RLv. 755, 762.
9. Shafer v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co., 248 App. Div. 279, 289 X. Y. Supp. 577
(4th Dep't 1936).
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action against the insurer. The defendant alleged a conspiracy to defraud10
and sought to prove it by questioning the client-witness as to statements
made by him in conference with the defendant's attorney. The appellate divi-
sion of the Supreme Court, reversing the trial court, found that, although
the rule of privilege prevents the client as well as the attorney from being
questioned," it cannot be invoked by a witness to shield himself "from a
disclosure which is a legitimate subject of inquiry."'12 Since witnesses have
found protection in the rule of privilege in comparable instances,1 3 it is un-
likely that the relationship involved in the present case, that of insured and
attorney for insurer, alone prompted the decision. It is probable that the
particular facts of the case combined to make the doctrine inapplicable, but
it is difficult to determine the significance of the vague qualification em-
ployed.14
The thought of the court may have been that it was "legitimate" to require
evidence from a witness over his objection of privilege when the subject of
inquiry is the disclosure of a communication relating to an intended fraud
or crime. If this was so, the court was restating a familiar rule in over-
general terms.15 If, on the other hand, the court simply wished to indicate
that testimony could be elicited, despite the objection of privilege, whenever
the court regarded disclosure as reasonable, it was in effect conceding that
the scope of the attorney-client privilege is controlled by judicial discretion,
and influenced by factual considerations like the difficulty of finding other
evidence to prove the matter in issue, 0 or the suspected presence of fraud
10. Affidavits, prepared by the defendant company, denying the plaintiff's negligence
were signed soon after the accident by the plaintiff and both her parents. The daughter
and her mother later claimed the affidavits were signed under a threat of loss of the
father's driving license.
11. Although Section 353 of the New York Civil Practice Act doqs not specifically
include a privilege to the client, the courts have implied such a protection. Bolt &
Co., Inc. v. Gilmore, 120 Misc. 116, 198 N. Y. Supp. 616 (Sup. Ct. 1923).
12. See Shafer v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co., 248 App. Div. 279, 289, 289 N. Y.
Supp. 577, 587 (4th Dep't 1936); cf. Dixie Mfg. Co. v. Ricks, 153 Ga. 364, 112 S. E.
370 (1922); Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corp., 139 Misc. 699, 249 N. Y. Supp. 631
(Sup. Ct. 1931). It is well established that a communication to an attorney representing
two parties is not privileged in a controversy between them. 5 WxiToaRE, EVIDENCE'
§2312. The court, in the instant case, might have found the client-witness and the
insurer opposing parties. But cf. Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corp., supra.
13. See Neugass v. Terminal Cab Corp., 139 Misc. 699, 249 X. Y. Supp. 631
(Sup. Ct. 1931). Where an attorney acts for two parties having a common interest,
the communications by each are privileged from disclosure at the instance of a third
person. 5 WIGMORE, EvmEc §2312. A third person, not one of the two original
parties, seeks disclosure in the instant case, and the defendant no longer has a common
interest with the client-witness.
14. This limitation was used on but 6ne other occasion. See Chellis v. Chapman,
7 N. Y. Supp. 78, 82 (Sup. Ct. 1889), aff'd on other grounds, 125 N. Y. 214, 26 N.E.
308 (1891) (defendant in breach of promise suit compelled to disclose whether he
delivered to his counsel letters received from plaintiff).
15. See note 8, supra.
16. The fact that the conversation at the conference, admittedly the crucial factor
in the disclaimer, could not be proved withbut the defendant's testimony was persuasive
or illegality with reference to the subject concealed. The formulation of a
broad rule of that sort, however, was not necessary to the decision of the
principal case, since limitations already well established might have been
invoked to require the testimony. For ecample, it might, with some justifi-
cation, have been held that no confidence could have been intended by the
client-witness since any information given by him with reference to the acci-
dent must have been imparted to the defendant in view of the duties of the
attorney to his client, the insurer. Likewise, it could have been said that
the attorney had been consulted in aid of a fraud intended by the client-
witness, or that the conversation in question was between an attorney and
a witness, not a client, and therefore that the privilege statute was not avail-
able.17
Since the adoption of "a legitimate subject of inquiry" as a criterion con-
verts a privilege, hitherto qualified only by loose exceptions, wholly into a
matter of discretion, it would seem politic to order that discretion by requir-
ing that the privilege be invoked only when the injury which would inure
to the attorney-client relation by reason of the disclosure of the communi-
cation is greater than the ultimate benefit secured to the public by such
a disclosure.' 8 This test, with its emphasis on public policy, seems desirable,
particularly in instances where the use of the privilege would prevent an
interrogation of legal advisers concerned with the bribery of public officials.10
The proof of conspiracy which would ordinarily avoid the privilege in cases
of that character is often difficult.20 The public interest is likewise a con-
sideration of importance in inquiries by Congressional committees 1 and ad-
ministrative agencies," balked by the defense of professional'confidence. If
courts, however, are reluctant to acknowledge the discretionary nature of
the rule of privilege,23 legislatures may respond to recent attacks on an
for disclosure in the principal case. Shafer v. Utica Mutual Insurance Co., 248 App.
Div. 279, 289, 289 N. Y. Supp. 577, 587 (4th Dep't 1936).
17. Bergmann v. Manes, 141 App. Div. 102, 125 N. Y. Supp. 973 (2d Dep't 1910).
1& A similar principle was advanced by Dean %Vigmore as one of four conditions
necessary to the establishment of any privilege against disclosure behveen persons in
a given relation. S WIGum , EviDENcE § 2285; see Re United States v. Mammoth Oil
Co. [1925] 2 D. L. 1L (Ont.) 66, 74; Ex tarte McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 244, 149
Pac. 566, 571 (1915) (dissent). See Wright v. Mayer, 6 Ves. 280, 281 (Ch. 1201).
19. See Address of Hon. Samuel Seabury (1932) 1S A. B. A. J. 371, 372.
20. See Wi'uom, EvmwNcE (Supp. 1934) § 2299.
21. See (1936) 45 YAu= L. J. 1503, 1504, r. 7.
22. See, e.g., Hearing Before the Securities and Exchange Commission, In the
Matter of Cuba Cane Sugar Corp. and Cuba Cane Products Co., Inc., 1152, 1162 (Oct.
2, 1935) ; but cf. McMann v. Engel, N. Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1937, p. 29, col. 1 (no brolter-
customer privilege is warranted in S. E. C. investigation).
23. See, e.g., Ex Pare McDonough, 170 Cal. 230, 149 Pac. 566 (1915), (1915)
29 HAIv. L REV. 109; Brooklyn Savings Bank v. Park Slope Realty Corp., 146 Misc.
4, 260 N. Y. Supp. 508 (Sup. Ct 1932).
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absolute rule24 by granting trial judges the discretionary power thought to
be desirable.25 The conservatism of trial courts can probably be relied upon
to limit avoidance of the privilege in private cases ;26 but where public interest
in disclosure is dear, the presence of discretionary judicial power can insure
subjection of the privilege to the more pressing need.27
RECOVERY BY EMPLOYEE AS BENEFICIARY OF CONTRACT' EMBODYING
MINIMUM WAGE ORDINANCE DESPITE RELEASE OF CLAIM*
AN EMPLOYEE of a construction company on a municipal dam project
beyond the city limits brought an action against his employer to recover
the difference between the wages he had received and those which he
claimed should have been paid him under an ordinance of the city requiring
minimum wages, varying with certain types of employment, which had been
expressly incorporated into the contract between the municipality and the
construction company. Holding that the plaintiff could maintain an action
as .donee beneficiary under the contract even though there was no express
provision for such a remedy either in the contract or in the ordinance, the
Supreme Court of Washington affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff. No
mention was made in the opinion of the fact that the jlaintiff had accepted
the lower amount without protest and had receipted payment in full.'
Although actions by individual residents against contractors for breach
of undertakings to furnish municipalities with certain types of public service
are frequently denied on the basis of a presumed intention to benefit the
citizens of the municipality collectively rather than individually,2 this prin-
24. See Whipple, The Duty of Disclosure (1922) 56 AM. L. Rnv. 801; Radin,
The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and Client (1928) 16
CA~w. L. REv. 487; cf. Address of Hon. Samuel Seabury (1932) 18 A.B. A. J. 371, 372.
But see 5 Wicmon, EvIDENcE § 2291; Brooklyn Savings Bank v. Park Slope Realty
Corp., 146 Misc. 4, 260 N.Y. Supp. 508 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
25. Compare N. C. COD AmN. (Michie, 1935) § 1798 (medical privilege).
26. Courts are often concerned over the possible loss of prestige and practice to
the attorney or physician. See Metropolitan Life Insur. Co. v. Boddie, 194 N. C. 199,
202, 139 S. E. 228, 230 (1927), citing N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1935) § 1798.
27. See State v. Martin, 182 N. C. 846, 850, 109 S. E. 74, 76 (1921). For reasons
of p'ublic policy, the physician-patient privilege has been avoided in many jurisdictions
in criminal cases, insanity proceedings, suits for personal injuries, and cases arising
under the Workmen's Compensation Acts, while waiver of the privilege in insurance
contracts has also been upheld. See Comment (1933) 81 U. op PA. L. Rrv. 755; (1932)
20 CAmr. L. REv. 302.
*Stover v. Winston Bros. Co., 185 Wash. 416, 55 P. (2d) 821 (1936).
1. Ibid., appeal dismissed for want of substantial federal question, 57 Sup. Ct. 44
(1936).
2. German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Home Water Supply Co., 226 U. S. 220 (1912);
H. R. Moch, Inc. v. Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N. Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928);
2 WILUSTON, CoNTRACIs (rev. ed. 1936) §373; RESTATammET, CONTRACTS (1932)
§ 145, illustration 2; Corbin, Liability of Water Companies for Losses by Fire (1910)
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ciple of construction has not been applied to minimum wage provisions in
municipal constiuction contracts. Since the employees of the contractor
are dearly the class for whose benefit provisions of this type are inserted in
municipal contracts, the right of a particular member of the class to main-
tain an action on the contract in his own behalf as donee beneficiary of
the contract is undisputed under the more hiberal view.3 Third party bene-
ficiary doctrines have been similarly applied in actions against the employer
based upon collective labor agreements 4 and the President's recent Reem-
ployment Agreement 5
19 YAIE L. J. 425. But cf. Ifugge v. Tampa Water Works Co., 52 FIa. 371, 42 So.
81 (1906); Pond v. New Rochelle Water Co., 183 N. Y. 330, 76 N. F 211 (1906);
Rigney v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R., 161 App. Div. 187, 146 N. Y. Supp. 395 (3d
Dep't 1914), aff'd, 217 N. Y. 31, 111 N. E. 226 (1916).
3. Hearn v. Ralph Solitt & Sons Constr. Co., 93 S. NV. (2d) 551 (Te. 1936);
2 Wsrissoir, op. cit. stpra note 2, §§ 356, 357, 363, 378; R.sras.rr, Courmcrs
(1932) §§ 135, 138, 139; Corbin, Contracts for the Bcnefit of Third Persons (191S)
27 YALE L. J. 1008; Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons i ti Fcderal
Courts (1930) 39 id. 601; Comments (1935) 15 B. U. L REv. 133, (1936) 6 Broonz.vu
L. Rnv. 64. Where there is a state statute prescribing minimum v.ages for workers
on public contracts, an employee can bring an action directly upon the employe's
breach of statutory duty. City of Glendale v. Coquat, 52 P. (2d) 1178 (Ariz. 1935) ;
Rhodes v. New Orleans G. N. Ry., 129 Miss. 78, 91 So. 281 (1922); see Comment
(1933) 42 YAm L. J. 762, 769; cf. Goebel v. Elliott, 178 Wash. 444, 35 P. (24) 44
(1934) (action on city ordinance where contract of employment made and performed
within city limits).
4. Dierschow v. West Suburban Dairies, Inc., 276 Ill. App. 355 (1934), (1935)
2 U. oF CH. L. REv. 335; Yazoo & M.V. R. R. v. Sideboard, 161 Miss. 4, 133 So.
669 (1931), (1931) 16 fnnr. L. REv. 100; Gulla v. Barton, 164 App. Div. 293, 149
N.Y. Supp. 952 (3d Dep't 1914); see Christenson, Legally Enforceable Interests in
American Labor Union, Working Agreements (1933) 9 Lrm. L J.69; Duguit, Collective
Acts as Distinguished from Contracts (1918) 27 Ym' L, J. 753; Fuchs, Collecti.v- Labor
Agreements in American Law (1925) 10 ST. Louis L. Rnv. 1; Rice, Collective Labor
Agreements in American Law (1931) 44 HAnv. L. Rv. 572; Comments (1932) 41
Y.s-n L. J. 1221, (1936) 15 Onm L. REv. 229.
5. N. R. A. Release No. 502, Aug. 27, 1933; Beaton v. Avondale, Colo. Dist. Ct,
2d Dist., Oct. 26, 1933, (1933) 82 U. oF PA. L. Rav. 283; Fryns v. Fair Lawn Fur
Dressing Co., 114 N. J. Eq. 462, 168 At. 862 (Ch. 1933); Canton v. The Palms,
152 Misc. 347, 273 N. Y. Supp. 239 (Buffalo City Ct. 1934); Wis. State Fed. of
Labor v. Simplex Shoe Mfg. Co., Circ. Ct Wis., Oct. 13, 1933, (1933) 1 U. S. I.
vEE 137, (1933) 32 Micir. L. REv. 270; Comments (1934) 14 B. U. L. RLv. 789,
(1933) 33 CoL. L. Ray. 1394. With respect to the N. R.A. Codes which followed see
Billig, The Worker's Day in Court: Employee's Right to Code Wa1ages (1934) 3 GEO.
WAsH. L. Ray. 1; Padwe, Right of Third Party Beneficiaries under the lA.LR.A.
(1934) 9 ST. JoHx's L. REv. 166. Direct recovery is similarly permitted in favor of
laborers and materialmen against the surety on a contractor's bond, unless the bond
cannot be interpreted to include protection for these classes. 2 Wxarsxor7, op. cit.
supra note 2, §372; Corbin, Third Parties as Beneficiaries of Contractors' Surely
Bonds (1928) 38 YAi.x L. J. 1; Corbin, The Law of Third Party Beneficiaries in
Penns3lvania (1928) 77 U. or PA. L. Rv. 1, 19; Campbell, Protection of Laborers
and Materialmen under Construciion Bonds (1935) 3 U. OF CL L. Ray. 1.
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Granted the position of an individual employee as a third party beneficiary
under the contract between municipality and employer, the effect of his
accepting wages less than the contractual minimum and receipting paiyment
in full depends on several circumstances. Since accord and satisfaction rest
-upon knowledge of the existence of the claim which is being renounced,0
the giving of such a receipt by the employee in ignorance of the employer's
duty to pay a greater wage would seem to present no bar to a subsequent
action for the wage differential. A similar result would follow if the con-
tract of employment specified no wage whatever and there were no dispute
as to the amount due the employee at the minimum rate; for the acceptance
of a lesser amount in satisfaction of a greater liquidated obligation is with-
out consideration. 7 Receipt of a sum certain, however, in settlement of an
unliquidated claim, with full knowledge on the part of the employee of his
possible right to a greater amount, would seem to constitute a valid defense
to a subsequent action by the employee on the same claim.8 In the Wash-
ington case there was no evidence of the employee's ignorance of the mini-
mum wage provision at the time of payment and receipt, and there was
apparently some confusion at the time of suit as to the amount due the
employee at the minimum rate, by reason of a dispute as to the type of
work done. Nor was the city ordinance available of its own force to avoid
the effect of the employee's renunciation on grounds of public policy:
The implied contract of employment was performed and apparently made,
and the release executed, outside the territorial jurisdiction of the city; and,
although the construction contract between the city and the employer was
made expressly with reference to the ordinance, the employment and release
agreements between employer and employee were not.0
There are holdings, however, based upon a public policy divorced from
specific legislation, to the effect that a contract made by A with C which
requires a-wilful breach of a former contract between A and B is unen-
forceable by A against C.10 The defendant's agreements with its employees
would seem clearly to have entailed a breach of its contract with the city
within the scope of this rule, particularly in view of the fact that the con-
struction contract was awarded the defendant upon a competitive bid based
expressly upon the minimum wage specified in the invitation, so that the
payment of the lesser wage resulted in an unjust enrichment of the con-
6. 1 WILLIsToN, op. ct. mpra note 2, §§ 128, 129; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
(1932) §417 et seq.
7. Pederson v. Portland, 144 Ore. 437, 24 P. (2d) 1031 (1933); 1 WILLISTON,
op. cit. mspra note 2, § 130.
8. See note 6, supra.
9. The effect of the employee's renunciation could have been avoided on grounds
of public policy, had the minimum wage provision been incorporated in a state statute.
City of Glendale v. Coquat, 52 P. (2d) 1178 (Ariz. 1935), 102 A. L. R. 842 (1936);
Larsen v. Rice, 100 Wash. 642, 171 Pac. 1037 (1918).
10. Roberts v. Criss, 266 Fed. 296 (C. C. A. 2d, 1920); Reiner v. North American
Newspaper Alliance, 259 N. Y. 250, 181 N. E. 561 (1932), (1932) 18 CoRN. L. Q.
84, (1932) 46 Htav. L. Rrv. 158; RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS (1932) § 576, comment
a; see Carpenter, Interference with Contract Relations (1928) 41 HAZv. L. Rav. 728.
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tractor in fraud of the city.n And, although the city could have recovered
the wage differential on behalf of the employees in an action for breach of
the contract in its own right, direct recovery by the employees would avoid
the circuity.1
I MAiUpACTUREFS' LiA=Ty xx TorT*
A RETAII.r purchaser of underwear claimed in an action against the manu-
facturer that he had contracted dermatitis as the result of the defendant's
negligent failure to remove a certain chemical introduced in the process of
manufacture. Since the 9everal launderings of the particular pieces had re-
moved most of any chemical originally present, the plaintiff's only evidence
was of the circumstances of the injury and of an excess of the chemical in
other pieces of the same brand. Finding that the presence of the chemical
caused the plaintiff's illness, that the condition of the underwear could not
have been detected by reasonable examination, and that nothing had happened
between the manufacture of the garment and its being worn which might
have changed its condition, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council re-
versed the High Court of Australia' and entered judgment for the plaintiff. -
"A manufacturer of products, which he sells in such a form as to show that
he intends them to reach the ultimate consumer in the form in which they
left him with no reasonable possibility of intermediate examination, and with
the knowledge that the absence of reasonable care in the preparation or
putting up of the products will result in an injury to the consumer's life or
property, owes a duty to the consumer," the Committee held, "to take that
reasonable care." 3
11. Horbach v. Coyle, 2 F. (2d) 702 (C. C. A. Sth, 1924); 3 Wzusrozr, Coz-
TRacrs (lst ed. 1920) § 1628; RESTATENmNT, CoNrMAcrs (1932) § 577.
12. The employee's failure to protest when accepting the lesser tvage should present
no bar to an action for the differential; for an employee would hardly be willing to
risk discharge by protesting, even though he may know of the greater vwage to which
he is entitled. Hearn v: Ralph Sollitt & Sons Constr. Co., 93 S. IV. (2d) 551 (Te..
1936) ; see 3 WIrzasToN, op. cit. mtpra note 11, § 1626.
*Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, [1936] A. C. 85 (P. C.).
1. Australian Knitting Mills v. Grant, 50 C. L. R. (Aust.) 387 (1933) (one justice
dissenting), reversing the Supreme Court of South Australia. Judgment on an implied
warranty against the retailer as codefendant was reversed on the first appeal, but this
judgment in turn was reversed on the second.
2. Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, [1936] A. C. 85 (P. C.), (1936) 6 CQw.
L. J. 118, (1936) 48 Juan,. REv. 78, (1936) 811. J. 92, (1936) 52 T. Q. RE. 12, (1936)
52 Scor. L. R-V. 46, (1936) 3 U. oF CHL L. REv. 673; see also Pilcher and Beale, Grant
v. Atustralim Knitting Mills-Liabilities of Man ufacturers and Retailers (1935) 9 Ausv.
L J. 288; Underhay, Manufacturers' i'ability: Recent Developmnents of Donolhge T,.
Stevenso= (1936) 14 CaN. B. REv. 283.
3. Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills, [1936] A. C. 85, 102 (P. C.), quoting from
Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A. C. 562, 599.
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Born of some dicta in Whiterbottont v. Wright4 a century ago, the prin-
ciple developed both in England and in America that the duty of manufac-
turers to use due care in their production is limited to those persons in privity
of contract with them.5 To this rule, however, an exception was early
acknowledged with respect to products regarded as "inherently" or "im-
minently dangerous."8 The process of extending this exception from articles
dangerous though flawless to articles dangerous if defective culminated in
this country twenty years ago in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company,7
where Judge Cardozo recognized as within its scope any article "reasonably
certain to place life and limb in peril when negligently made."" Although
there is apparently no article which, if defectively produced, could not rea-
sonably be held to come within the scope either of this rule or of that of the
Privy Council, the latter would seem in a sense to' go slightly further. The
New York court in the MacPherson case took pains to demonstrate that
recovery in that state had not been limited to "instruments of destruction"
and that an automobile with a latently defective wheel was reasonably certain
to be dangerous; the Privy Council concluded without much ado, from the
fact of the injury itself, that woolen undergarments containing free sulphites
were potentially so dangerous to the consumer' as to support the inference
4. 10 M. & W. 109 (Ex. 1842). Winterbottonm v. Wright decided only that breach
of contract is insufficient in itself to give a stranger to the contract an action for con-
sequential damages. See Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A. C. 562, 589, 594.
5. See (1933) 46 HAgv. L. Rnv. 530. This limitation has generally been explained
as an expression of public policy. See Earl v. Lubbock, [1905] 1 K. B. 253, 259; Mullen
v. Barr & Co., [1929] Sess. Cas. 461, 476, 479; Comment (1927) 40 HARv. L. REv. 886,
890; cf. Burkett v. Studebaker Bros. Mfg. Co., 126 Tenn. 467, 474, 150 S. W. 421, 423
(1912) (to limit litigation). It has also been suggested that injury to anyone but the
immediate vendee of the manufacturer is not foreseeable. But see BOHLEN, STUDIES IN
THE LAw or ToRzs (1926) 124.
6. Thomas v. Winchester, 6 N. Y. 397 (1852) (poison).
7. 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. E. 1050 (1916), (1916) 25 YAnn L. J. 679; see Comment
(1916) 29 IHAfv. L. R-v. 866.
. 8. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 389, 111 N. E. 1050, 1053
(1916) ; see Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Persons other than their Inimediate
Vendees (1929) 45 L. Q. Rav. 343, 359; cf. T3iramares Corp. v. Touche, Niven & Co.,
255 N. Y. 170, 180, 174 N. E. 441, 445 (1931); CAnxozo, THE GRoWTir OF THE LAW
(1924) 77.
9. The instant case is apparently the first in either England or America to allow
recovery for a defect in clothing. Contra: Kerwin v. Chippewa Shoe Mfg. Co., 163 Wis.
428, 157 N. W. 1101 (1916) ; Cook v. Garside & Sons, 145 Misc. 577, 259 N. Y. Supp.
947 (Sup. Ct. 1932). Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A. C. 562, the famous snail in
the bottle case in which the doctrine of privity had "had its brains knocked out" [see
(1936) 52 L. Q. RPv. 12, 13], might have been limited to goods distributed in sealed
packages. See Farr v. Butters Bros. & Co., [1932]'2 K. B. 606, 614. The Privy
Council, however, recognized that a sealed package is only one means of proving that
the defect has been caused by the manufacturer. Grant v. Australian Knitting Mills,
[1936] A. C. 85, 106 (P. C.).
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of a duty of care in their manufacture. The British rle may, therefore, lend
itself less readily to a process of distinction in future cases.m°
The general duty of the manufacturer in Great Britain may, of course, be
limited with respect to the classes of persons to whom the duty is owed, the
types of manufacturer-whether final or sub-processor or both-who owe the
duty, and the sorts of injury which the duty comprehends. The duty of the
manufacturer under the American cases has been extended beyond vendees"
to users who were not vendees at all,'2 and, even further, to persons in some
way connected with vendees 13 and to others in mere physical proximity to
them.' 4 There has been a corresponding tendency in this country toward
imposing the duty on all processors along the line of manufacture: The sub-
processor has been held to the same duty of due care in the manufacture of
his particular part of the finished ptoduct as the final processor,1 r and the
latter, in addition to being held liable for negligence in his own stage of the
manufacturifg process,1  has also been held-to a duty of adequate inspection
of the product coming to him from the sub-processor.' 7 Again, the type of
10. See PolIock, The Snail in the Bottle, and Thereafter (1933) 49 L. Q. R7. 22,
24. The MacPheron case has been distinguished in the lower New York courts.
Jaroniec. v. Hasselbarth, 223 App. Div. 182, 185, 228 N. Y. Supp. 302, 305 (3d Dep't
1928) (mattress); Cohen v. Brockway Motor Truck Corp., 240 App. Div. 18, 19, 26S
N. Y. Supp. 545, 546 (1st Dep't 1934) (truck door); Creedon v. Automatic Voting
Machine Corp., 243 App. Div. 339, 341, 276 N. Y. Supp. 609, 611 (4th Dep't 1935)
(voting machine); see Johnson v. Cadillac Motor Co, 261 Fed. 878, 826 (C. C. A. 26,
1919). The requirement of privity of contract has been held since the instant case
to apply to persons injured as the result of a defect in a house. Otto v. Bolton &
Norris, [1936] 2 Y. B. 46, 55, noted disapprovingly, (1936) 52 L. Q. REv. 313.
Sioux Falls Serum Co., 44 S. D. 421, 184 N. W. 252 (1921).
11. Heckel v. Ford Motor Co., 101 N. J. L. 385, 128 At. 242 (1925) ; Murphy v.
12. O'Brien v. American Bridge Co., 110 Minn. 364, 125 N. V. 1012 (1910);
Crist v. Art Metal Works, 230 App. Div. 114, 243 N. Y. Supp. 496 (Ist Dep't 1930).
13. Barabe v. Duhrkop Oven Co.,-231 Mass. 466, 121 N. E. 415 (1919) (landlord
of purchaser); Clark v. Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co., 3 N. J. Misc. 284, 149 AtL 828
(Sup. Ct. 1930) (tenant of purchaser); Crane Co. v. Sears, 163 Okla. 603, 35 P. (2d)
916 (1934) (employee of tenant of purchaser).
14. Kalinowsld v. Truck Equipment Co., 237 App. Div. 472, 261 N. Y. Supp. 657
(4th Dep't 1933) (pedestrian); Flies v. Fox Bros. Buick Co., 196 Wis. 196, 218 N. W.
855 (1928) (same).
15. Smith v. Peerless Glass Co., 259 N.Y. 292, 181 N. E. 576 (1932) ; REsr,%TmnmIu,
ToRTs (1934) § 395, comment f; see Martin v. Studebaker Corp., 102 N. J. L 612, 615,
133 At. 384, 3S6 (1926). Contra: Tipton v. Barnard & Leas Mfg. Co., 302 Mo. 162,
257 S. W. 791 (1924).
16. Quackenbush v. Ford Motor Co., 167 App. Div. 433, 153 N. Y. Supp. 131 (3d
Dep't 1915) ; Reed & Barton Corp. v. Maas, 73 F. (2d) 359 (C. C.A. 1st, 1934).
17. MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N. Y. 382, 111 N. B. 1050 (1916) ; Marsh
Wood Products Co. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 207 Wi. 209, 240 NST. V. 392 (1932). At
the same time, where the manufacturer, either processor or siubprocessor, has been clear-
ly responsible for the defect, his negligence is not insulated by an intermediate agent's
opportunity or duty to inspect, or, often, by the agent's knowledge of the defect. Op-
portunity: Krahn v. 3. L. Owens Co., 125 Minn. 33, 145 N. W. 626 (1914). Duty:
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* injury for which recovery may be had has been extended in the United States
to include injury to property, under various criteria of foreseeability,18 as
well as to persons. There is little authority in England on which to base an
estimate of the extent to which the general duty of care recognized by the
Privy Council is likely to be limited by these several considerations. But
any limitation of the class of persons to whom the duty is owed short of the
degree to which the American cases have gone in this regard would seem
inconsistent with the general extension of the manufacturer's duty in the
principal case.' 9 A similar inconsistency would be created by a restriction of
the duty to the final processor, unless he were held either strictly liable for
his failure to discover defects in the product coming to him from the sub-
processor or vicariously liable for negligent manufacture by the latter.20
With respect to the type of injury suffered, there should be no difficulty in
England, within the Polemis doctrine,21 in allowing recovery for property as
well as personal damage.?
To whatever extent the general duty imposed by the Privy Council may
be limited by these considerations, however, the rule of the British case,
together with the liberal application, in actions by remote vendees against
manufacturers, of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, approaches a rule of ab-
solute liability for defects. Res ipsa loquitur has been used not only to shift
to the defendant-upon proof by the plaintiff of the injury, the defect, and
the causal connection-the burden of introducing evidence of the general use
of a careful process of manufacture;23 it has been used also to require proof
by ihe defendant of due care in the manufacture of the particular article
which is alleged to have caused the injury,24 and sometimes, as in the instant
Rosebrock v. General Elec. Co., 236 N. Y. 227, 140 N. E. 571 (1923). But see Mac-
Pherson v. Buick Motor Co., supra, at 390, 111 N. E. at 1053. Knowledge: Bryson v.
Hines, 268 Fed. 290 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920); Farley v. Edward E. Tower & Co., 271
Mass. 230, 171 N. E. 639 (1930). Contra: Stultz v. Benson Lumber Co., 59 P. (2d)
100 (Cal. 1936).
18. See (1934) 32 Micn. L. R-v. 1007; (1930) 14 MiNN. L. Rav. 306, 307.
19. Cf. Brown v. Cotterill, 51 T. L. R. 21 (K. B. 1934); Howard v. Furness-
Houlder Argentine Lines, 55 Ll. L. L. Rep. 121 (K. B. 1936). But cf. Grant Y. Australian
Knitting Mills, [1936] A. C. 85, 103 (P. C.).
20. But of. Otto v. Bolton & Norris, [1936] 2 K. B. 46, 57; Evans v. Triplex
Safety Glass Co., [1936] 1 All E. 1. 283, 286 (- B.).
21. In re Polemis, [1921] 3 K. B. 560, 572, 57.7.
22. Cf. Anglo-Celtic Shipping Co. v. Elliott, 42 T. L. R. 297 (K. B. 1926); see
Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A. C. 562, 599.
23. Reed & Barton Corp. v. Maas, 73 F. (2d) 359, 362 (C. C. A. 1st, 1934)
sctable; Coakley v. Prentiss-Wabers Stove Co., 182 Wis. 94, 98, 195 N. W. 388, 389
(1923) semble.
24. Krahn v. J. L. Owens Co., 125 Minn. 33, 145 N. W. 626 (1914).. Negligence
will be more readily inferred where the defect is due to the non-performance of an
essential part of the manufacturing process than where a casual defect has not been
discovered. See Comment (1927) 40 HAv. L. Rav. 886, 888, n. 9; compare Armstrong
Packing Co. v. Clen, 151 S. W. 576 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912), with Hasbrouck v. Armour
& Co., 139 Wis. 357, 121 N. W. 157 (1909).
[Vol. 46
case, largely to excuse failure of the plaintiff to prove the defect itself.p
Furthermore, although the plaintiff is said to bear the burden of refuting the
possibility that the defect was caused after the product left the defendant's
hands, 26 the proof with which courts have been satisfied on this issue, again
as in the instant case, may make this obstacle more theoretical than real. -
No great change in practical result would, therefore, seem to be involved in
the adoption-within certain limitations of parties plaintiff, parties defendant
and types of injury-of an express rule of absolute manufacturers' liability.-
Such a rule would have much to commend it.2- The manufacturer, more
particularly the final processor, is in a better position than anyone else to
prevent the loss by using due care, to shift it to an insurer, to distribute it
among consumers by raising his price, and, if he prefers, to avoid it entirely
by leaving the business.-30 Moreover, the general reliance on his name would
facilitate the choice of a defendant in a field where the causes of the accident
are often so complex as to obscure the source of the particular defect.
THE NEw HAMPSHImE AUTOMOBILE ComPEhzsATioN BMiL
LEGISLATION designed to facilitate the equitable distribution of the econ-
omic loss resulting from automobile accidents has been directed primarily
toward assuring payment of judgments through some form of financial respon-
sibility or compulsory insurance plan. Little legislative attention has been
directed toward improving the system by which claims are recognized in
the first place. The theory of negligence with its many defences as admin-
istered by judge and jury under orthodox rules of evidence and procedure
has proved peculiarly costly and difficult of application in these cases. And
the courts have become so hopelessly clogged with such litigation that the
injured party frequently finds it more desirable to agree to an unfavorable
- settlement than to await trial.'
25. Cf. Oliver v. Saddler & Co., [1929] A. C. 534.
26. See (1936) 48 Juam. REV. 78, 79. fere prolonged use of an article has defeated
recovery. Lynch v. International Harvester Co., 60 F. (2d) 223 (C. C. A. 10th, 1932);
Blacker v. Lake & Elliott, 106 L. T. R. 533 (K. B. 1912).
27. Cf. Jump v. Ensign-Bickford Co., 117 Conn. 110, 167 AtL 90 (1933); Australian
Knitting Mills v. Grant, 50 C. L. R. (Aust.) 337, 440 (1933).
28. Some courts have reached practically the same end by enforcing an implied
warranty running with the goods. Davis v. Van Camp Packing Co., 1S9 Iowa 775, 176
N. IV. 382 (1920); Baxter v. Ford Motor Co., 168 Wash. 456, 12 P. (2d) 409 (1932).
Contra: Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235 N. Y. 463, 139 N. F. 576 (1923).
29. Cf. Andrews, Relation of W~orkuen's Compensation to Accident Prevention
(1926) 123 AzAnxs 205; (1937) 46 YAME L. J. 713.
30. See Douglas, Vicarious .Uabilift and Administrat ion of Rish (1929) 33 YAL-
L. J. 534, 588; Feezer, Social Justice in the Field of Torts (1927) 11 Umn. L. Rsv.
313, 324; Comment (1937) 37 CoL. L. REv. 77, 79.
*bz- re Opinion of the justices, 87 N. H. 492, 179 At. 344 (1935).
1. See generally FpENcH, TH- AuroToam Co.wErisAvTio PLuir (1933) 10-43;
GREGORy, LIr.isLATrvE Loss DisraiBurIoi Ia NEGLIGENCE Acrio:s (1936); Report by
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A bill recently introduced into the New Hampshire Senate attempted a
more comprehensive solution of the automobile accident problem.2 A com-
mission was proposed, consisting of two department heads and a chairman
appointed by the governor, to hear motor accident cases, make findings, and
render awards, to the extent of $3,000 to a single complainant, for personal
injury, death or property damage in excess of $5. s Although the com-
mission was to grant a hearing de novo to holders of unsatisfied non-default
judgments in the regular state courts, upon complaint made within a speci-
fied time,4 its original jurisdiction was apparently to be limited to resident
car owners who should have furnished security for their own liability as
defined in a previous statute,5 No complaint could be filed with the com-
mission during the pendency of an action at law; nor could an action at
law be maintained after the filing of a complaint.0 The defendant could deny
the jurisdiction of the commission upon proper proof of insurance or owner-
ship of property out of which a judgment might be satisfied; 7 and the right
to jury trial was to be waived by application for motor registration or an
operator's license, by the filing of a complaint, or, in the case of a non-
resident, by the use of the public highways.8 Hearings were to be con-
ducted by. one or more members of the commission or an appointed referee,0
and counsel could be employed by either party, the fee of counsel for the
complainant being fixed by the commission.10 Although the commission was
empowered to mdke whatever rules, .presumably of evidence and procedure,
it felt were necessary to carry out the plan, existing doctrines of negligence
and its defences were not altered." The right to appeal was limited to review
by the Supreme Court on questions of law;12 the findings of fact of .the
the Committee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents to the Columbia Univer-
sity Council for Research in the Social Sciences, 1932, 17-131; Symposium, Financial Pro-
tection for the Motor Accident Victim (1936) 3 LAw & CoNTEmP. Pnoo. 465-578; Bal-
lant~ne, A Study of Compensation for Automobile Accidents (1930) 16 A. B. A. J. 97,
98; Diak, Liability and Compensation for Automobile Accidents (1937) 21 MilN. L. REV.
123; Ives, Compulsory Liability Insurance (1924) 10 A. B A. J. 697, 698; Lewis, Accident
Litigation (1924) 72 U. o- PA. L. REv. 400; Marx, Compulsory Compensation Insurance
(1925) 25 CoL. L. REv. 164.
2. Senate Bill No. 37 (N. H. 1935).
3. Id., §§ 1-3, 13.
4. Complaint was to be filed within thirty days of the issuance of the judgment.
td., §§ 18, 19.
5. The act required the complainant to give the commission immediate notice of
the accident and claim and to file his complaint within six months. Id., §§ 4-6. The
commission was to serve the defendant by mail, the regular nonresident motorist statute
being used for nonresidents. Id., § 7.
6. Id., § 29.
7. If the plaintiff objected to the denial, the issue was to be settled at a preliminary
hearing with the burden of proof on the defendant. Id., §§ 11, 12.
8. Id., §17.
9. Id., §§3(11), 9, 10.
10. Id., § 8.
11. Id., §§3(VI), 16.
12. The commission might also transfer any question of law to the court on its
own motion. Id., § 15.
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commission were to be final, and its orders when certified to the Superior
Court were there to be entered as judgments upon which ordinary executi6n
might issue.13 When an award remained unsatisfied for thirty days, it was
to be paid from a special state fund raised by charging one dollar in addition
to the regular fee for an operator's license and five dollars additional for
registration of every car not adequately insured.14 Payment was to be made
in two installments, half immediately and the other half, or as much of it
as remained -in the fund, at the end of the year.Yu The state was then to be
subrogated to the judgment rights of the complainant, with a lien on all real
estate and motor vehicles of the defendant, and the debtor's right to drive
was to be suspended.'0 The Supreme Court of New Hampshire held in an
advisory opinion that, notwithstanding the reservation of judicial review,
this plan involved a delegation of'judicial power to the executive branch of
the government which violated the provision with respect to separation of
powers in the state constitution, because the primary duty of the commis-
sion was not to administer a legislative policy or to perform a regulatory
function, but to adjudicate private litigation.17
The proposal, however, contains more serious infirmities than those raised
on the score of constitutionality. Leaving the jurisdiction of the regular courts
in automobile cases unimpaired, the bill was so phrased that, aside from the
provision for complaint by a judgment creditor, only an insured car owner
was apparently to be entitled to initiate a proceeding before the commission,
and even his complaint was to be subject to dismissal except by an uninsured
and financially irresponsible defendant. There would have been little in-
centive, with the maximum award limited to $3,000 and payable from a
fund of doubtful financial stability, for a .party sustaining serious injury to
forego a jury trial; md in a case under such a scheme where the plaintiff
would benefit by proceeding before the commission, the defendant would
be more than likely for that very reason to deny its jurisdiction, if he could
prove financial responsibility. The proposed bill, therefore, cbuld hardly
have afforded more than some guaranty of payment;' and even in that
respect it would probably have been less effective, in view of the limited
awards and the precarious character of the fund out of which they were
to be paid, than a compulsory insurance law of the type in effect in
Massachusetts.' 9 Finally, no solution would seem to go to the root
13. Id., §§ 14, 21, 22.
14. Id., §§24, 25.
15. Id., § 26.
16. Id., §§ 23, 27, 28.
17. In re Opinion of the Justices, 87 N. H. 492, 179 AtI. 344 (1935).
18. Suspension of the defendant's license (see note 16, mipra), moreover, hardly
seems an effective sanction for enforcing payment; and in the case of a person dependent
on driving as a livelihood it would also operate as a great hardship. Many financial
responsibility laws are open to the same criticism. See Repprt, mipra note 1, at 100.
19. 'MAss. Gm. LAws (1932) c. 90, §34(a)-(U); see Report, supra note 1, at
111-131; Symposium, supra note 1, at 537-578.
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of the automobile accident problem which did not discard the perspective
of negligence or fault.
20
Automobile accident compensation plans divorced both from the courts
and from the legal concept of negligence have been widely discussed.
2 1
Their proponents generally suggest, in essence, a specially qualified board
to hear motor accident controversies and award compensation, regardless
of fault,22 for specified injuries and loss of time; payments would vary,
within defined limits, according to the complainant's weekly wage.23 Sincp
the right to a court trial and the rules of negligence would be abolished
and judicial review limited to questions of law, a scheme of this type
would, it is contended, relieve court congestion, afford a hearing free from
technical rules of evidence and procedure, and consequently decrease in
great measure the expense and time required to obtain a judgment under
the existing system. At the same time compensation awards, instead of
being influenced, like jury verdicts, by the defendant's ability to pay, would
bear a more satisfactory and consistent relation to the loss sustained. Com-
plementing this scheme of rendering awards, a system of compulsory com-
pensation insurance would guarantee their full and prompt payment.2 4
Increasing the insurance rate for each individual in proportion to the num-
ber or amount of the awards rendered against him would tend to discourage
carelessness as well as incentives to collusion;25 and the cost of automobile
accidents would be equably distributed among the entire motoring community
at a price which should not be prohibitive.20
20. See note 11, supra. Such an approach has yet to be made. See Symposium,
supra note 1, at 584. See generally FaxNcH, op. cit. supra note 1, c. 2; Report, supra note
1, at 217; Symposium, stepra, at 579-597" Carman, Is a Motor Velicle Accident Coinpen-
satio Act Advisable? (1919) 4 Mimx. L. Rv. 1. But see Ives, loc. cit. supra note 1;
Sherman, Comments on Report to Columbia University (Pamphlet submitted to Com-
mittee of Nine on Financial Responsibility for Automobile Accidents, 1932); Sym-
posium, supra, at 598.
21. See note 20, supra. A model compensation plan has been prepared by the Com-
mittee to Study Compensation for Automobile Accidents. Report, supra note 1, at
137-143; see Symposium, supra note 1, at 579-582.
22. The owner's liability would be limited under the Columbia plan, however, to
injuries "caused by" the operation of his motor vehicle, in order to allow the courts
some flexibility in excluding certain types of accidents. In an accident involving two
or more automobiles each owner would compensate the occupants of his own car and
the owner of the other, but not himself. See Report, supra note 1, at 138-140.
23. An arbitrary wage would be assumed in the absence of actual earnings. See
Report, supra note 1, at 140; Symposium, supra note 1, at 594. But see id. at 603.
24. See Report, supra note 1, at 143. Compulsory insurance now exists in Massa-
chusetts, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Finland, Great Britain, Norway, Sweden,
and Switzerland. See D~ak, supra note 1, at 136. The Massachusetts act has been
upheld. In re Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 147 N. E. 681 (1925) ; see (1930)
44 HARV. L. Rav. 123; cf. Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 68 L. Ed. 596 (1924)
(New York compulsory liability insurance statute for certain public carriers).
25. See Symposium, supra note 1, at 592. But see id. at 551.
26. See Report, spra note 1, at 156, 288; Symposium, supra note 1, at 590. But
see id. at 607.
A compensation plan of this sort, creating a definite legislative policy
properly administrable by a special board whose rulings would be subject
to jtiicial review on questions of law, would seem, on the close analogy
of workmen's compensation statutes,- ' to violate neither the doctrine of
separation of powers nor any other constitutional guarantee.23 Motorists
have frequently been regarded as a distinct class subject to special control
within the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment2 Simi-
larly, the due process clause should not prevent the legislative extinction of
the common law cause of action for negligence in automobile cases in favor
of a statutory system of automobile accident liability without fault 0 and
due process of law insures simply a fair hearing, not necessarily a court
trial.3 ' At the same time the right to jury trial which is guaranteed in the
several state constitutions may be denied, with the abolition of a particular
cause of action, on the ground that there is nothing left for the jury to try.a2
27. Workmen's compensation acts have almost uniformly been held constitutional.
Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219 (1917); see Note, L. P. A. 1916A
409.
28. See Report, supra note 1, at 162; Sherman, supra note 20, at 45. The federal
constitution does not forbid a state to confer judicial functions on non-judicial bodies.
See Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U. S. 210, 225 (190S). But the state con-
stitutions generally require that the three essential powers of government be kept as
independent of each other as possible. N. H. CoNsT. I, art. =VII; CoLU.'mrA Uzrn-
vERsrry, IxnEx DIGEST or STATE CoNsTrurTris (1915) 526-529. Although most wor:-
men's compensation acts are administered by special boards, the New Hm pshire act
is administered by the state courts. N. H. PuB. LAws (1926) c. 178.
29. It re Opinion of the Justices, 251 Mass. 569, 147 N. E. 631 (1925); cf. N. Y.
C. H. R. v. White, 243 U S. 1-8 , 208 (1917) (workmen's compenmsati6h). The exclusion
of non-resident complainants, as provided in the New Hampshire bill (§ 4), might
raise another constitutional issue. But, based on residence rather than citizenship, such
a provision would seem not to violate the privileges or immunities clause. Cf. Douglas
v. N. Y., N. L & H. R. R., 279 U. S. 377 (1929); see Comment (1936) 45 YA.n
L. J. 1235, 1243, nn. 134, 140.
30. Cf. N. Y. C. R. R. v. Vhite, 243 U. S. ISS (1917).
31. Reetz v. Michigan, 188 U. S. 505 (1903).
32. Such denial would seem to violate neither the Fourteenth Amendment [see
N. Y. C. H. R. v. White, 243 U. S. 188, 203 (1917)], nor the Seventh [see Mountain
Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 235 (1917)], nor the usual state constitution
[see N. H. ConsT. I, art. XX; INDEX DIGEST, op. d. m.pra note 23, at 800 -04; cf.
N. Y. CoxsT. art. I, § 21. If the cause of action were not abolished, however, a pro-
vision such as that in the New Hampshire bill (see note 8, supra), to the effect that
mere use of the state highways by a nonresident should constitute a vaiver of jury
trial, might be held violative of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. See, on this
doctrine, Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights (1935) 35 Cor.
L. REv. 321; authorities cited in Comment (1936) 45 YArm I J. 1100, 1111, n. 59.
19371 NOTES
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 46
STATUTORY DOUBLE LIABILITY OF SHAREHOLDERS IN BANK HOLDING
COMPANIES*
GROuP banking systems controlled by holding companies unauthorized to
carry on the business of banking,' are a comparatively recent development in
this country.2 Although statutes allowing one corporation to purchase the
stock of another generally are sufficiently broad to permit the formation of
bank holding companies,3 in several states the provisions for stock ownership
have been limited to corporations organized for, similir purposes,4 thus mak-
ing it doubtful whether group banking systems -could exist.5 In some states,
indeed, the purchase of bank stock by non-banking corporations has been
expressly hedged by restrictions, 6 or even conditioned on the submission of
the holding company to strict governmental supervision." Although these
restrictions may have been adopted largely because of a legislative' distrust of
*Barbour v. Thomas (C. C.A. 6th, Nov. 11, 1936).
1. Bank holding c9mpanies have been incorporated under the general corporation
laws of the states. See CARiNzHouR, BaRicir, GROUP AND CHAIn BANKING (1931)
203; Legis. (1935) 48 HIagv. L. Ray. 659, 667. But cf. Wis. Stat. (1935) § 221.56.
2. Hearings before Committee on Banking and Currency on H. R. 141, 71st Cong.,
2d. Sess. (1930) 70. But although large holding companies- originated in 1926, smaller
closed corporations holding bank stock have existed for thirty years. CARTINHOUR, Op. Cit.
supra note 1, at 96.
3. See Legis. (1935) 48 HARv. L. Rv. 659, 666; Mica. Ops. A'n'e" GEN., 605, 607
(1929) (authorizing the formation bf the Detroit Bankers Company). Arizona, Iowa,
Nebraska, and South Dakota have no statutory provisions, but the courts have occasion-
ally permitted stock ownership between corporations without the benefit of statutes.
White v. G. W. Marquardt & Son, 105 Iowa 145, 7.4 N. W. 930 (1898); 6 Fiznrcun,
CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS, (Pern. ed. 1931) § 2825.
4. See e.g. KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) § 17-603; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1936)
§883b-2; VT. PUB. LAws (1933) § 5818.
5. See MIcH. Ops. Avt'" GEN. 605, 607 (1929). Nor is it generally possible for
a banking corporation to assume the functions of a holding company. CARTixnOUR, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 196. Bank holding companies may, however, be formed in foreign states
where the corporation laws aie more liberal. [PooR, BANmc, GOVmUNENT AND MUN.
VOLUME (1934) 1311]. But states may impose restrictions on such foreign corporations
[see note 7, infra], or may require them to license as doing business within the state.
Bankers Holding Co. v. Maybury, 161 Wash. 681, 297 Pac. 740 (1931) ; see 17 Fr.LEcnE,
op. cit. supra note 3, § 8490.
6. See e.g. MicHr. Comw. LAWS (Mason, Supp. 1933) § 10135-10, as amended Mich.
Pub. Acts 1935, § 194; Miss. LAws (1934) .. 146, § 72; WAsH. REv. STAT. (Remington,
Supp. 1936) § 3243-1; W. VA. (Official Code, 1931) c. 31 § 8-38; ef. Ky. STAT. (Carroll,
1936) § 581 (forbidding any "person" to own more than one half the stock of any bank);
VT. PUB. LAws (1933) § 5819 (forbidding the incorporation of holding companies).
7. See e.g. N. Y. BAXNG LAw § 39; ORE. CODE ANN. (1930) § 25-502. Several
states have set up certain requirements such as adequate capitalization of the holding
company, as a condition precedent to the right to vote or receive dividends from the
stock. KAN. Ray. STAT. ANN. (Supp. 1933) § 9-125b; N. J. Comp. STAT. (Supp.
1930) tit. 47, § 3a(3), (4), (14); Wis. STAT. (1931) § 221.56, as amended Wis. Laws
1935, c. 393 (also imposing a secondary liability on holding company stock holders).
See also 49 STAT. 710 (1935), 12 U. S. C. § 61 (Supp. 1936).
NOTES
centralized private control over banking,8 it is not unlikely that the desire
to forestall evasion of the statutory double liability assessments upon bank
stockholders ° was of some persuasive force, since the prospect of holding
companies being without assets ample enough to meet the assessments was
not unreal, and, at that time, there was no certainty that the statutes imposing
liability would be declared applicable judicially to stockholders of large holding
companies.' 0 Such a declaration was forthcoming for the first time in a recent
case. There the stockholders of several Detroit banks exchanged their stock
for that of the Detroit Bankers Company, a Michigan holding corporation.
To protect the creditors of the various banks, a provision Nwas inserted in the
charter of the holding company and in each share of its stock," whereby the
stockholders agreed to assume whatever statutory liability should attach to
that company as a result of the insolvency of any of the unit banks. After
the bank holidays of 1933, the subsidiary banks failed to re-open, and since
the holding company was without assets, the receiver of the national bank
involved sought to recover the double assessment directly from the holding
company's shareholders. These shareholders in turn sued to enjoin the
assessment, disclaiming any title to the stock, and contending that the con-
tractual provisions assuming liability were unenforceable on several grounds.m
The receiver denied the allegations of the complaint and filed a cross bill
seeking a judgment against the plaintiffs for the amount of the assessments.
The Federal District Court denied the injunction and awarded judgment to
the receiver on his counterclaim apparently both because the plaintiffs, as the
beneficial owners of the stock, were within thd scope of the federal statute
imposing double liability on shareholders of insolvent national banks,13 and
because the contracts were enforceable by the receiver as a third party bene-
ficiary. This decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals for the
S. See Hearings before Committee on Banking & Currency on H. R. rpx, 71st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1930) 1069; 75 CoNG. REc. 9899 (1932).
9. Statutes imposing double liability on bank stockholders have been passed ia
almost all of the states. See 2 Mhcnm, BAmn-s Aim BAZZnnG (Perm. ed. 1931) §22; 3
ZOLLAX, BANN.S AND BAI-Xn;G (Perm. ed. 1936) § 1611. Possibly because of the
administrative difficulties inherent in enforcing statutory assessments, there is a present
tendency to substitute deposit insurance for the older form of super-added liability. 49
STAT. 684, 12 U. S. C. 264 (Supp. 1935) (permanently establishing the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation); Legis (1936) 36 Co. L. REV. 80S; 4S STAT. 1S9 (1933), 12
U. S. C. 64 a (1934) (repealing Rzv. STAT. §5151 (1875), 12 U.S. C. § 63 (1934) 'which
imposed double liability on stockholders of insolvent national banks).
10. See Hearings before Committee on Banking & Currency on H. R. x41, 71st
Cong., 2d Sess. (1930) 34, 888, 1139; CARmnnHOUR, op. cit. stpra note 1, at 245; 3
Zou.asm , op. cit. mipra note 9, at § 1770.
11. The stockholders of the banks also signed an agreement and power of attorney
authorizing a committee to form a holding company, the shareholders of which should
be subject to super-added liability.
12. The plaintiffs relied on the Statute of Frauds, a vague theory of res judicata,
and the peculiar causation of the insolvency, which it was contended -was not within the
contemplation of the parties.
13. R v. STAT. § 5151 (1875), 12 U.S.C. §63 (1934).
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Sixth Circuit solely on the ground that double liability attached to beneficial
ownership of ihe stock.14
Although bank stockholders have used several devices to avoid statutory
assessments; they have thus far met with small success. The courts have
held that double liability statutes may either be enforced against the record
holder of bank stock who is estopped from denying a liability upon which
creditors of the bank are presumed to have relied,'" or enforced against the
"beneficial owner," a term which has been given a broad application. Thus,
if a stockholder attempts to evade his statutory obligations by recording the
stock in the name of an agent,'0 or a corporation,' 7 or a trust,18 and yet re-
tains all the advantages of ownership, the courts have invariably fastened
liability on him. The principal case is consistent with that sequence of de-
cisions. The instant court, while sustaining the direct assessment upon the
holding company stockholders, refrained from recourse to the overworked
14. Barbour v. Thomas (C. C. A. 6th, Nov. 11, 1936) aff'g, 7 F. Supp. 271 (E. D.
Mich. 1933), Comment (1935) 33 MicHr. L. REv. 273; (1935) 2 U. OF Cm. L. Rev. 484.
Moreover, it was contended that the assessment itself was invalid because the insolvency
of the bank allegedly resulted after the bank holidays from unwarranted governmental
interference and from the mismanagement of the Comptroller after the bank had closed.
These contentions were properly dismissed by both the lower court and the Circuit
Court of Appeals, since the legality of the bank holidays has frequently been upheld
[Schnader v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 314 Pa. 140, 170 Atl. 686 (1934)], and
the validity of an assessment is not conditioned upon the causation of the insolvency.
Chase v. Hall, 30 F. (2d) 195 (C. C. A. 9th, 1929) ; Crawford v. Gamble, 57 F. (2d)
15 (C. C.A. 6th, 1932).
15. Lantry v. Wallace, 182 U. S. 536 (1901); Rawlings v. Meredith, 80 F. (2d)
254 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935). But the record holder will not be held liable if the stock was
acquired without his knowledge or consent unless he has accepted benefits conferred by
the stock. Keyser v. Hitz, 133 U. S. 138 (1890) ; Goess v. Brown, 12 F. Supp. 517 (E.
D. N. Y. 1935) ; 2 lxcH=, op. cit. supra note 9, at 121.
16. National Bank v. Case, 99 U. S. 628 (1878) ; Pauly v. State Loan & Trust Co.,
165 U. S. 606 (1897); Ohio Valley Nat. Bank v. Hulitt, 204 U. S. 162 (1906); see
Houghton v. Hubbell, 91 Fed. 453, 455 (C. C. A. 1st, 1899) (both agent and principal
liable).
17. Corker v. Soper, 53 F. (2nd) 190 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931) cert. denied, Corker v.
Howard, 285 U. S. 540 (1932), (1931) 45 HARv. L. REv. 580; Durrance v. Collier, 81
F. (2d) 4 '(C. C. A. 5th, 1936) ; Metropolitan Holding Company v. Snyder, 79 F. (2d)
263 .(C. C. A. 8th, 1935), (1935) 20 MiNN. L. REv. 312; Harris Inv. Co. v. Hood, 123
Fla. 598, 167 So. 25 (1936) ; see 3 ZOLLMxAN, op. dt. supra note 9, at § 1770.
18. English v. Gamble, 26 F. (2d) 28 (C. C. A. 8th,. 1928); Fors v. Farrell, 271
Mich. 358, 260 N. W. 886 (1935); (1935) 20 MiNir. L. REv. 217; Maddison v. Bryon,
31 N. M. 404, 247 Pac. 275 (1926). The creation of a trust for the single purpose of
evading the statute is not, however, a prerequisite to the validity of an assessment against
the beneficiaries. Laurent v. Anderson, 70 F. (2d) 819 (C. C.A. 6th, 1934) aft'g, Keyes
v. Am. Life & Accid. Ins. Co., I F. Supp. 512 (E. D. Ky. 1932) ; O'Keefe v. Pearson,
73 F. (2d) 673 (C. C. A. 1st, 1933). The determining factors seem to be whether the
trust contains assets other than bank stock and whether these assets are sufficient to
meet the assessment. Cf. Taylor v. Davis, 110 U. S. 330 (1883) ; Heidin v. Cremin, 66
F. (2d) 943 (C. C. A. 8th, 1933).
and misleading terminology associated with "piercing the corporate veil."'
Although the court might have reasoned in terms of the e:dstence or non-
existence of the corporate entity of the holding company as has been done in
analogous cases involving small corporations, -0 in actions involving evasion
of statutory duty by the use of the corporate form, inquiry is not to be directed
into such channels, but rather is to be confined to an examination of whether
there has been any infringement of the terms of the statute.2 ' This vras ap-
parently the policy of the principal court, and the conclusion that the holding
company stockholders were beneficial owners of the bank stock and for that
reason writhin the anbit of the Act seems unassailable.22 Yet a similar holding
in every action involving a direct assessment against holding company stock-
holders is not a necessary consequence of the decision, which may be limited
to its controlling facts. It is difficult, however, to isolate the factual elements
which compelled the conclusion of the principal court. Probably of decisive
importance was the fact that the holding company was without assets suf-
ficient to satisfy the assessment.2 Furthermore, the stock of the holding
19. For observations on the clouded conceptualism involved, see Berkey v. Third
_Ave. Ry. 244 N. Y. 84, 94, 155 N. E. 58, 61 (1926); Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v.
Pierson, 130 Misc. 110, 119, 222 N. Y. Supp. 532, 543 (Sup. Ct. 1927); LArn, Sun-
smzpuus mw ArrxuAr Coo 0ponros (1936) § 3. Douglas & Shanks, Insulation
from Lfability Throggh Subsidiary Corporations (1929) 39 YAtE L. J. 193, 195.
20. See Metropolitan Holding Company v. Snyder, 79 F. (2d) 263, 266 (C. C.A.
8th, 1935) ; Harris Inv. Co. v. Hood, 123 Fla. 598, 613, 167 So. 25, 31 (1936). Contra:
Durrance v. Collier, 81 F. (2d) 4 (C.C. A. 5th, 1936). In the leading case of Corker
.. Soper, 53 F. (2d) 190 (C. C. A. 5th, 1931) the court expressly refused to disregard
the corporate entity of the corporation holding the bank stock but allowed recovery
against its controlling stockholder on the theory that the corporation was merely the
agent of the defendant who was thus a beneficial owner within the statutory provisions.
Compare (1932) 10 N. C. L. REv. 2 , with (1935) 2 U. oF CHr I. REv. 434.
21. United States v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. 56 Sup. Ct. 341 (1936); Comment
(1936) 46 Y.um L. J. 299; LA=rr, op. cit. stipra note 19, at 54. In these cases questions
of control, assets, mid corporate ritual are of importance only as they reveal a violation
of the statute. Thus the "control" of a subsidiary coal company by its parent becomes
important when the issue is whether the parent is "operating" a coal mine. United States
v. Lehigh Valley R. R. Co., 220 U. S. 257 (1911). Yet courts in these cases customarily
talk about the disregard of the corporate-fiction. United States v. Del L. & W. R. R.
233 U. S. 516 (1915) ; United States v. Reading Co., 253 U. S. 26 (1920).
Likewise in tort or contract cases emphasis should be placed not on the metaphysics
of the corporate entity but rather on provable factors such as the observance of corporate
ritual, the actual control reserved or exercised by the "parent," the adequacy of the
subsidiary's capitalization, and the question of who was the actual promisor on the
contract or the real actor in the tort. See Douglas, supra note 19.
22. See notes 16, 17, 18, supra.
23. Insolvency of the transferee corporation or trust has been emphasized in every
case involving evasion of double liability statutes. See cases cited supra notes 16, 17 and
18. Statutes recently enacted in several states likewise reveal the necessity of assets
sufficient to meet statutory assessments. See note 7, m.ipra. Under these statutes liability
would probably be enforced against the holding company rather than its stocdholders.
See 3 Zom.mA.., loc. cit. mtpra note 10.
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company represented only bank stock, the dividends of which were paid over
to the holding company stockholders intact, the court regarding the holding
company merely as a medium for the protection of its stockholders' interests
as beneficial owners of the bank stock.24 It is also significant that the holding
company stockholders had represented themselves as assuming the double
liability peculiar to bank stock,25 and the reliance of the depositors and
banking authorities upon this "holding out" is almost sufficient of itself to
estop the plaintiffs from denying direct responsibility.2" It id impossible to
ascertain the precise effect accorded any one of these factors, but owing to
the persistence with which the courts have enforced double liability statutes,
it is reasonable to suppose that the same result will be reached in all cases in
which the holding company itself is unable to satisfy the double assessment.27
Resort to this more general analysis was not necessary in the instant case,
however, for an independent basis of decision was afforded by the contractual
provisions under which the holding company stockholders assumed liability
for the double assessment.28 The contracts, incorporated in the articles of asso-
ciation and printed on each share of the holding company stock, were sufficient-
ly ambiguous, however, to make the selection of a proper theory of recovery
embarrassing. Yet it is a plausible interpretation that, although the promise
to pay assessments was addressed to the holding company, the performance
was to run to the bank, and therefore that the bank's receiver might sue
directly as a third party beneficiary.2 It is equally plausible, however, that
both the promise and the performance were to be directed at the holding
*24. The fact that one receives all the benefits conferred by the stock has been of
controlling importance. See Fors v. Farrell, 271 Mich. 358, 369, 260 N. W. 886, 891
(1935); Broderick v. Alexander, 268 N. Y. 306, 309, 197 N. E. 291, 292 (1935).
25. Permission for the formation of the Detroit Bankers Company was expressly
conditioned on the acceptance by the stockholders of the contractual provisions inserted
in the shares. Cf. Micn. O's. Ar'v, GEx. 605, 608 (1929). Furthermore, the names
of the holding company stockholders were listed with the banking authorities.
26. Ross v. Penn. R. R., 106 N. J. L. 536, 148 Atl. 741 (1930). Quald v. Rathowsky,
183 App. Div. 428, 170 N. Y. Supp. 812 (1st Dep't 1918), aff'd, 224 N. Y. 624, 121 N. E.
887 (1918). Cf. cases cited supra note 15; Lyons v. Westwater, 181 Fed. 681 (C. C. A.
3d, 1910); Fed. Res. Bank v. Crothers, 289 Fed. 777 (C. C. A. 4th, 1923).
27. See Laurent v. Anderson, 70 F. (2d) 819, 823 (C. C. A. 6th, 1934).
28. The agreements provided that: "The holder of each share of common stock of
this corporation shall be individually and severally liable . . . . for any statutory
liability imposed .upon this corporation by reason of its ownership of shares of capital
stock of any bank or trust company,' and further that "the stockholders . . . severally
agree that such liability may be enforced in the same manner and to the same extent
as statutory liability may now or hereafter be enforceable against stockholders of banks
or trust companies . . "
29. Smith v. Thompson, 250 Mich. 302, 230 N. W. 156 (1930) ; RES TAT=tENT, Co;r-
TaAcrs (1932) §§ 133, 136; see Pa. Cement Co. v. Bradley Contracting Co., 7 F. (2d)
822, 825 (C. C.A. 2nd, 1935). Colqr is given this view by the provision in the contracts




company. 0 In that event the bank's receiver would be unable to recover
in accordance with orthodox third party beneficiary doctrine.3 ' Yet a re-
laxation of the technicalities of that doctrine seems perfectly proper in cases
similar to the principal one in which the conceded intent of the undertaking
was to insure the protection of the unit banks and their depositors.as Indeed
so obviously was the function of the promise one of secondary liability, ex-
tending credit to the limited class of persons within the contemplated pro-
tection of double liability statutes, it would be more realistic to read the con-
tract as a surety contract and predicate recovery on that theoryPas Since the
promise under any construction was nominally addressed to the holding
company, the Statute of Frauds is no obstacle.3 4 But even if these theories of
recovery had failed, the bank receiver might still have prosecuted suit directly
against the stockholders, but in the name of the holding company's receiver
who had shown no inclination to collect the assets.33
30. The phrase, "in the same manner" may mean "in a comparable" rather than
"in an identical" manner.
31. Utah-Idaho Live Stock Loan Co. v. Blackfoot City Bank, 290 Fed. 55 (E. D.
Idaho, 1921) Grand Prairie Gravel Co. v. Trinity Portland Cement Co., 295 Fed. 140
(C. C. A. 5th, 1923) ; Morris v. Hummel, 75 F. (2d) 681 (C. C. A. 7th, 1935).
32. An intent to benefit is a well recognized justification for the application of the
third party beneficiary doctrine. Cf. In re Wolf Mfg. Industries, 56 F. (2d) 64 (C. C.A.
7th, 1933); Tweeddale v. Tweeddale, 116 Wis. 517, 93 N. IV. 440 (1903): Such an
intent may be evidenced by a promise to pay directly to the third party but the intent
itself would seem to he the operative fact. See Ulman v. Nat, Surety Co., 3 F. Supp.
348, 349 (E. D. Mont. 1933) ; Concrete Steel Co. v. Ill. Surety Co., 163 Wis. 41, 46, 157
N.W. 543, 544 (1916).
33. See North v. Joseph NV. North & Son, 93 N. J. L. 433, 442, 103 At. 244, 246
(1919); Comment (1935) 24 CatIw. L. Rnv. 193, 195; cf. Union Oil Co. of Calif. v.
Pac. Surety Co., 182 Cal. 69, 187 Pac. 14 (1920). The situation can be distinguished
from that involving an indemnity against loss in which direct recovery by creditors has
been denied. Cushman v. Carbondale Fuel Co., 122 Iowa, 656, 93 N. W. 503 (1904).
34. Clay Lumber Co. v. Hurts Branch Coal Co., 174 Mich. 613, 140 N. W. 912
(1913); see Corbin, Contracts of Indemnity and Statute of Frauds (1928) 41 HArnv. L.
Ruv. 689, 693.
35. The permission of the state court would first have to be secured by a petition.
Cf.. Ohio Valley v. Mack, 163 Fed. 155 (C. C. A. 6th, 1906) ; it re Bailey, 151 Fed. 953
(F. D. Pa. 1907) ; Googins v. Skillings, 118 Me. 299, 10 Atl. 50 (1919) ; 5 Rnm-MIGoTr,
Bxurcy (3d ed. 1923) § 2223.
